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Sammendrag 
Litteraturen som omhandler modeller for tilpasning i markeder med matching har etter hvert blitt 
omfattende. Aktører i slike markeder søker etter en passende match blant potensielle partnere. 
Eksempler på slike markeder er arbeidsmarkedet og ekteskapsmarkedet. I noen tilfeller kan 
tilpasningen inkludere forhandlinger om kontraktbetingelser. I denne artikkelen generaliserer vi 
resultater oppnådd tidligere av Dagsvik (2000) og Menzel (2015) for slike modeller. Vi viser blant 
annet at under generelle forutsetninger medfører vår tilnærming til et praktisk og fleksibelt 
modellrammeverk som er velegnet til empirisk analyse, og som inkluderer diskrete 
arbeidstilbudsmodeller (Dagsvik og Jia, 2016)) som spesialtilfelle. 
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1. Introduction 
Many important markets are matching markets, where agents are searching to obtain a match 
with a suitable partner. Examples include the marriage market, the labor market, and the 
education market. Most of the literature on two-sided matching markets is theoretical. That is, 
this literature focusses on analyzing matching under different rules of the game when 
preferences of the players (suppliers and demanders) in the market are known and fulfill 
specific requirements. The theoretic analysis of this type of markets begins with the famous 
article by Gale and Shapley (1962), and since then a large literature has emerged, see Roth 
and Sotomayor (1990), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and Lauermann and Nöldeke (2014) 
and the references therein.   
 In contrast to the theoretical literature, the issue addressed in this paper is how to 
recover the preferences of the agents in the market from data on observed matching outcomes. 
To this end, it is necessary to develop an equilibrium model for matching behavior that links 
the distribution of individual preferences to observed matching behavior. A first attempt to 
deal with this problem in the non-transferable case (NTU) was made by Dagsvik (2000). He 
obtained equilibrium asymptotic fractions of realizing matches of specific observable types in 
large markets, with a finite number of observed types of agents on either side of the market, 
including the choice of contracts from a finite menu. The approach of Dagsvik (2000) 
consisted in showing that the realizations of a matching game can be viewed as if they were 
the outcome of a series of discrete choice problems where the suppliers and demanders make 
choices from their respective choice sets under equilibrium. However, the equilibrium concept 
of Dagsvik (2000) differs from the one used by Menzel and in this paper. His notion of 
equilibrium is a probabilistic one in the sense that suitable equilibrium conditions are only 
supposed to hold “on average.” Also, he did not prove that the distribution of the equilibrium 
choice sets in a finite population actually exists. Apart from a special case, he also did not 
show that the fractions of realized matches of each type converge (under equilibrium) to the 
corresponding asymptotic fractions. Recently, Menzel (2015) made an important extension of 
Dagsvik (2000) by demonstrating that equilibrium choice sets do indeed exist for any 
matching algorithm. He also extended the framework of Dagsvik (2000) by allowing for 
continuous individual characteristics of agents. Furthermore, he generalized the matching 
5 
game to a setting where each pair of agents (supplier and demander) only have knowledge 
about a random subsample of potential partners, specific to each pair of agents. Under more 
general distributional assumptions than asserted by Dagsvik (2000), Menzel also derived 
similar equilibrium choice probabilities for realizing particular matches when the market is 
large. 
Other related approaches that develop aggregate relations for matching markets are 
based on the transferable utility (TU) assumption (Shapley and Shubik, 1972), and include 
Gretsky et al. (1999), Choo and Siow (2006), Chiappori et al. (2012), Galichon and Salanie 
(2010, 2012). See Menzel (2015) for a more complete review of the recent related literature 
on matching models. In some matching markets, the transferable utility assumption (TU) may 
seem restrictive. For example, in modern labor – and marriage markets it might be argued that 
the TU assumption does not seem to correspond to a realistic description of actual matching 
schemes.  
 In this paper, we extend the analysis of Dagsvik (2000) and Menzel (2015) in several 
ways. First, we extend and complement Dagsvik (2000)’s analysis by showing that equilibri-
um choice sets also exist in the case when flexible contracts are allowed in the matching mar-
ket. A contract may be a price, a dowry or a non-pecuniary agreement (such as marriage or 
cohabitation in the marriage market). This type of matching models can be applied to study 
many different economic phenomena, see, for example, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). Sec-
ond, we relax the distributional properties of the utility functions in that we only require some 
weak regularity conditions to hold and we derive the corresponding aggregate equilibrium 
model for the general case. This enables us to provide a unified treatment of several types of 
matching models appearing in the literature, as well as some extensions. It includes several 
NTU and TU models analyzed recently in the matching literature as special cases. In particu-
lar, we show that the TU model of Choo and Siow (2006) emerges as a limiting case of the 
NTU model (without flexible contracts) as the correlation between utilities across observa-
tionally identical potential partners tends towards one. In other words, the TU model of Choo 
and Siow (2006) can be viewed as a limiting case of a version of our NTU model with inter-
dependent preferences and no flexible contract. This result can thus be interpreted as an NTU 
foundation of the TU model. Moreover, we show that the model can be extended to accom-
modate latent random effects that represent match quality or attractiveness between potential 
pairs of suppliers and demanders. In the presence of such random effects, preferences between 
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suppliers (demanders) and potential partners become correlated. As a special application of 
this extension, we show that our framework can be accommodated to include the case where 
each pair of agents only has knowledge about a random sample of potential partners. Menzel 
(2015) also discusses the latter case and he states particular equilibrium relations which he 
does not prove. Finally, we discuss welfare analysis and estimation issues when different 
types of data are available.  
We think that our modeling framework (as well as Menzel’s formulation) should be of 
interest in several contexts. First, it might be helpful for addressing more general and realistic 
stability and equilibrium issues in matching markets, in contrast to many traditional analyses 
that often are based on stylized frameworks. Second, it offers a convenient structural 
framework for conducting empirical analyses of matching markets. For example, it allows 
researchers to identify and estimate the distribution of preferences from observations on the 
number of realized matches. Third, the approach provides an explicit micro-foundation for 
macro relations in matching markets without relying on the representative agent postulate or 
restrictive assumptions about the distribution of preferences and constraints. Fourth, since the 
model is a structural one, it can be applied to compute distributional and aggregate effects 
from counterfactual policy reforms, such as the effect of changing the ex ante distribution of 
the different types of agents in the market, as well as the distributional and welfare effect of 
economic incentives (e.g., such as taxes/costs and other benefits in the labor- and education 
markets), depending on the application under study.  
 In the setting, we consider agents are assumed to have sufficient information to be able 
to rank over potential partners. However, each agent has, ex-ante, no information about the 
preferences of other agents. Like Crawford and Knoer (1981), we believe that an analysis of 
this case can yield useful predictions about markets, where conditions are sufficiently stable 
over time for agents to have had enough time to learn about their environments. Such an 
analysis is, at any rate, a necessary prerequisite for the study of the effects of imperfect 
information.1  
The matching concept applied in this paper differs from the one applied by Mortensen 
(1978, 1982), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Jovanovic (1979, 1984), see Mortensen (1988) 
for a review. In their approach suppliers and demanders are uncertain about who are the 
                                                     
1 Agents have full information in the sense that they are able to form preference lists of all potential partners in the economy. 
They have, however, no information ex ante about their equilibrium choice set of available matching candidates.  
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potential partners and they are therefore unable to make preference lists of potential partners, 
ex-ante. Recall that in contrast, our framework allows for, in a preliminary stage, that a subset 
of suppliers and demanders meet (or gather information about each other) randomly. 
Subsequently, in the second stage, the matching takes place within this random subsample. 
The match quality random effect mentioned above is somewhat analogous to the match 
quality parameter introduced by Jovanovic (1979, 1984). Recall that in the setup of Jovanovic 
suppliers and demanders are also uncertain about the quality of the match at the moment the 
match is formed, and the quality is revealed gradually over time. This is different from our 
approach where the quality of the match is revealed instantly upon inspection of the available 
alternatives in the (current) choice set. In the terminology of Jovanovic (1984), this case 
corresponds to the match being a pure inspection good. However, one might imagine a similar 
dynamic extension of our theory where the matching quality random effects are updated 
similarly according to experience and where separations occur when the match quality falls 
below a threshold. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an informal summary of 
the main idea and our analytic approach. In Section 3 we discuss how one can treat a 
matching market as a series of one-sided discrete choice problems. In Section 4 we derive the 
probabilistic modeling framework for large markets under equilibrium conditions. To achieve 
our aggregate equilibrium relations we apply a stochastic representation of the distribution of 
the preferences of the demanders and the suppliers. The stochastic formulation serves to 
represent unobserved heterogeneity in the preferences of the agents. This, in turn, allows us to 
apply the probabilistic theory of discrete choice to develop an equilibrium model, that is, the 
probability that a given demander (supplier) shall obtain a match with a supplier (demander) 
at a specific contract. Section 5 discusses various extensions of the model. Section 6 contains 
results on identification and estimation strategies. Section 7 contains a discussion on measures 
of welfare and gain from a match.  
2. Informal summary of approach and main results  
This section provides an informal summary of main results as well as the central ideas of our 
analytic approach. Similar to Dagsvik (2000) and Menzel (2015) a key idea of our approach is 
to show how one can “simplify” a two-sided matching game as if it were a series of one-sided 
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choice problems subject to suitably defined agent-specific choice sets. That is, we show how 
it is possible to define these choice sets such that the solution of the matching game will be 
the same as if the agents made their choices independently from their respective choice sets of 
potential partners. Dagsvik (2000) was the first one to pursue this idea but he only discussed 
the existence of these sets for some special type of stable matchings.2 In this paper, we prove 
that such choice sets exist for any stable matching. More importantly, these choice sets are 
subject to a set of restrictions that result from market competition, and can, in large markets, 
be characterized by a system of equations (Theorem 1). Menzel (2015) obtained analogous 
results for the case with no flexible contract.  
 To deal with possible observed heterogeneity, we group agents into different types 
according to observed characteristics and model the matching game within a random utility 
framework so as to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences as well. Our goal is to 
obtain a structural relationship (model) between the distribution of agents’ preferences and the 
number of realized matches between suppliers and demanders (say) of each combination of 
observable types. Given such a model one can recover (partially) preferences from observed 
matching behavior. This setup allows us to establish equilibrium relations that determine the 
equilibrium choice sets. This is possible because the equilibrium choice set of a supplier (say) 
is the set of demanders that prefer to be matched with this supplier (conditional on the 
respective equilibrium choice sets of the demanders), see Section 3.2. However, these 
equilibrium choice sets are not unique. The key difficulty here is that the agents’ choice sets 
are not only random but also endogenous in the sense that they depend on their own and all 
the other players’ preferences. We show that when the size of the market increases without 
bounds, the endogeneity is no longer important and the sizes of random equilibrium choice 
sets become sufficient statistics for these sets. At first glance, this result may not seem 
intuitive since it implies that, from the analyst’s point of view, equilibrium in large markets 
can be viewed as if individual choice sets were exogenous with deterministic sizes. There are, 
however, similar results in other fields of economics. For example, within the field of 
economics of networks, the Aldous-Hoover representation theorem states that any infinitely 
exchangeable random network can be modelled as if the links were formed independently, 
                                                     
2 Also, Dagsvik’s equilibrium solution concept differs somewhat from the one applied here and by Menzel (2015). Dagsvik’s 
concept is based on the notion of “aggregate” equilibrium. This means that the relations that determine the equilibrium 
restrictions are only assumed to hold on average across identical repetitions of the matching game. 
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although the setting obviously appears to involve complicated strategic interaction. A perhaps 
more familiar example is the competitive market where agents are viewed as price takers, 
although individual behavior influences market prices. The intuition in our case is that when 
the market size is large the corresponding equilibrium choice sets also become large. As these 
choice sets of potential partners increase essentially every level of attractiveness of potential 
candidates will eventually be represented in the choice sets. Therefore, it does not matter how 
the members of the choice sets were selected. Menzel (2015) has also obtained a similar 
result. Our approach to deal with this problem is, however, completely different from his. See 
Section 4.2 for a more detailed description of our approach.    
 Once the endogeneity problem is dealt with, one can apply standard results to derive 
probabilities for an agent’s most preferred candidate conditional on his choice set. These 
probabilities must satisfy particular aggregate equilibrium conditions that follow readily from 
the corresponding disaggregate equilibrium conditions mentioned above. When the market 
size increases, we show that the sizes of the choice sets (suitably normalized) converge with 
probability one to their corresponding unique asymptotic and deterministic values. These 
values depend on the products of deterministic parts of utilities of the suppliers and the 
demanders of specific types in a simple way (analogous to Nash products in bargaining 
theory) (Section 4.1). Since preferences appear in the model solely through “Nash products” 
this implies that one cannot obtain identification of the distribution of preferences on each 
separate side of the market without additional data on preference orderings of the suppliers or 
the demanders. 
 Next, our analytical approach is extended to more general cases. We show that one can 
allow utilities of the demanders to be correlated with the utilities of the suppliers. This type of 
correlation might be due to latent aspects that represent attractiveness, which in our setup is 
represented by a random effect. This is particularly apparent in the marriage market where the 
attraction between a particular woman and a man typically cannot be predicted by a third 
party. We demonstrate (Section 5.1) that in this case the asymptotic number of realized match 
is determined in a similar way as the baseline case (Section 4.1). With the exception that the 
“Nash product” is replaced by its expectation which is taken with respect to the latent random 
effect. This result also allows us to study the case where agents have limited information 
about potential candidates in the market. Usually, the agents participating in a matching 
market have limited information about the potential candidates on the opposite side of the 
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market. Similarly to Menzel (2015) we consider a setting in which the matching process takes 
place in two stages. In the first stage, a subsample of suppliers and demanders meet (or gather 
information) at random. Here, it is understood that the information process is symmetric in the 
sense that if supplier s obtains information about demander d, demander d also obtains 
information about supplier s. In the second stage, the matching takes place as if the subsample 
obtained in the first stage were the whole market. In this paper, we show that this case can be 
treated as a special case of the setting with interdependence between the utilities of demanders 
and suppliers (Section 5.2). Menzel (2015) also states, without proof, an equivalent result.  
 Another extension we can deal with by using our approach is the case when the 
preferences of a supplier (demander) of a specific type are correlated with the preferences of a 
supplier (demander) of the same type (Section 5.3). This case is of interest empirically 
because it allows the researcher to account for potential latent characteristics that may be 
correlated across agents of the same observable type. Moreover, this result turns out to be 
useful for establishing a link between the NTU and TU approach. By using the framework 
developed in Section 5.3, we show in Section 5.4 that the TU model of Choo and Siow (2006) 
can be obtained as a limiting case of the NTU as the correlation between utilities of agents of 
the same type tends towards one (Theorem 7). 
 We have also attempted to relax the distributional assumptions further (Section 5.5). 
We find that the main convergence results are still valid (Theorem 8). However, the equations 
that determine the asymptotic number of realized matches of each combination of types 
become more complicated.   
3. Behavior in matching markets as a discrete choice problem 
In this section, we shall first discuss how one can “simplify” a two-sided matching game as if 
it were a series of one-sided choice problems subject to suitably defined agent-specific choice 
sets. That is, we show how it is possible to define suitable agent-specific choice sets such that 
the solution of the matching game will be the same as if the agents made their choices 
independently from their choice sets of potential partners. Under equilibrium conditions to be 
discussed below, the choice sets are subject to a set of restrictions that result from the market 
competition. Similar to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), we consider an extended setting of the 
classical matching game (Gale and Shapley, 1962), in which we allow for a finite menu of 
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flexible contracts. Flexible contracts are important in many matching markets. The contracts 
are not just limited to money. It could be any types of agreements between the two parties, for 
example, type of cohabitations in the marriage market as discussed by Mourifie and Siow 
(2014), working hours and job-specific tasks to do in the labor market, and tuition fee in the 
education market. This setup allows us to take into account restrictions on the set of possible 
contracts in applications. For example, in the labor market, the set of feasible hours of work is 
usually constrained due to institutional regulations. Even the wage possibilities are limited in 
several sectors in the labor market.  
 As in a standard matching market, there are two kinds of agents which we may term 
suppliers and demanders, such as women and men in the marriage market and firms and 
workers in the labor market. Each supplier is looking for a suitable match with a demander, 
and vice versa. When they form a match, they choose from a set of exogenously given 
possible contracts. Only one-to-one matchings are considered here. Each agent has 
preferences over all the combination of potential partners and potential contracts (including 
the option of remaining unmatched). An agent’s characteristics affect his or her own 
preferences and also enter as attributes in the utility functions of potential partners. However, 
a priori the agents only know their own preferences and have no information about the 
preferences of other agents. This implies that the agents have, ex-ante, no information about 
their “chances” of establishing a match with the respective potential partners.  
3.1. Stable matchings with flexible contracts and the extended Deferred Ac-
ceptance algorithm. 
In the literature on two-sided matchings, the condition that ensures equilibrium is the one of 
stable matching, see Gale and Shapley (1962) or Roth and Sotomayor (1990).  It is easy to 
extend this concept to the case with a finite menu of flexible contracts. This extension has also 
been made by Crawford and Knoer (1981) for the case where the contracts are wages and 
later by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) for more general contracts. However, their approach is 
different from ours.  
 Consider a matching where supplier s and demander d are matched together at  
contractω , but at least one of the two agents would prefer to be single rather than being 
matched to the other. Then this matching is said to be blocked by the unhappy agent. Second, 
consider a matching where supplier s and demander d are matched at contractω , but both 
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prefer to be matched at another contract, or they are not matched to one another but prefer 
each other at some contract to their assignment in the actual matching. Then the combination 
( , , )s d ω  will be said to block the matching. We say that a matching is stable if it is not 
blocked by any individual or combination of agents and contracts.  
 To show the existence of a stable matching defined above, we modify the Deferred 
Acceptance algorithm (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Under this algorithm, the matching 
game takes place in several stages. Only one side of the market (say, demanders) is allowed to 
make offers. In the first stage, each demander makes an offer to his most preferred 
combination of contract and supplier. Each supplier rejects the offer from any demander who 
is unacceptable (i.e. ranked lower than the option of remaining unmatched), and each supplier 
who receives more than one offer from any demander rejects all but his or her most preferred 
among these. Any supplier whose offer is not rejected at this point is kept “engaged” (at some 
contract).  At any step, any demander who was rejected at the previous step makes an offer to 
her next preferred combination of supplier and contract so long as there remains an acceptable 
offer consisting of a combination of supplier and contract that has not yet been offered. The 
supplier then rejects any offer from unacceptable demanders and also rejects all but his or her 
most preferred combination of contract and demander including the combination of contract 
and demander that was kept engaged from the previous step. The algorithm stops after any 
step in which no combination of demander and contract is rejected. The matches are now 
consummated based on the agents’ current engagements.  
 
 Proposition 1 
 In a matching market with strict preferences and with a finite set of flexible contract 
there exists a stable matching. 
 
 The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. A similar result has also been 
obtained by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) in their setting. Note that if it is assumed instead 
that the suppliers make the offer, the realized matching will be different. Similarly to the 
original stable matching case, the number of stable matchings for a given market can be large. 
It is essential that the menu of contracts is finite because in the infinite case with non-
monotonic preferences there is no guarantee that the extended Deferred Algorithm described 
above will converge. 
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3.2. Equilibrium choice sets in a matching market with flexible contracts 
In the following, we shall introduce our definitions of supply, demand and choice sets and use 
these to introduce an alternative representation of the matching problem.   
 Let SΩ denote the set of N suppliers and DΩ the set of M demanders, and W a finite set 
(menu) of potential flexible contracts. Let ( , )SsU d ω  be the utility of supplier s of a match with 
demander d at contract ,ω ( , )DdU s ω  the utility of supplier d of a match with supplier s at 
contract ,ω (0)SsU  and (0)DdU  the respective utilities of being self-matched (single). The 
single option is always available. Let ( , ) 1Ssy d ω =  if demander d belongs to the choice set of 
supplier s at contract ω  and zero otherwise. Similarly, let ( , ) 1Ddy s ω =  if supplier s belongs to 
the choice set of demander d at contract ω  and zero otherwise. Let 
{ ( , ), , }S S Ds sy y d d Wω ω= ∈Ω ∈  and { ( , ), , }.D D Sd dy y s s Wω ω= ∈Ω ∈  We realize that Ssy  and Ddy  
represent the choice sets of supplier s and demander d, respectively.3 We define the 
constrained supply function ( , , ),S Ss sJ d yω  as  
(3.1) 
1 if ( , ) max(max max ( , ) ), (0))   
( , , )
0 otherwise,
D
S S S S
s s s sS S v Wk
s s
U d U k v y (k,v U
J d y
ω
ω ∈∈Ω
 ≥= 

 
 
for all , .Dd Wω∈Ω ∈  Note that the supply function is defined for all d, irrespective of whether 
or not d is available to supplier s. Similarly, we define the constrained demand function 
( , , )D Dd dJ s yω  as 
(3.2)        
1 if ( , ) max(max max ( , ) ), (0)) 
( , , )
0 otherwise,
S
D D D D
d d d dD D v Wk
d d
U s U k v y (k,v U
J s y
ω
ω ∈∈Ω
 ≥= 

 
for all , .Ss Wω∈Ω ∈  Recall that here the elements of Ddy  are (given) hypothetical values that 
represent the choice set of demander d and the elements of Ssy  are (given) hypothetical values 
that represent the choice set of supplier s.4 Our approach based on the constrained supply and 
demand functions defined above is different from Adachi (2000), but analogous. Menzel 
(2015)’s approach is similar to Adachi (2000).   
                                                     
3 To use indicator functions to represent sets is common in Mathematics, see for example, Mirkin (2013). 
4 The notion of choice sets used here is not fully precise, but is chosen for convenience. To be precise, the respective single 
options must be included.  
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As in Section 2 let { ( , )}SsY d ω  and { ( , )}DdY s ω  denote the corresponding equilibrium 
choice sets. The equilibrium values of the choice sets satisfy 
(3.3)                              ( , ) ( , , )D S Sd s sY s J d Yω ω=   
and   
(3.4)                              ( , ) ( , , )S D Ds d dY d J s Yω ω=   
for , , ,S Ds d Wω∈Ω ∈Ω ∈  where SsY  and DdY represent the respective equilibrium choice sets of 
supplier s and demander d. 
 
 Theorem 1  
 (i) Suppose that the agents’ preferences are strict. Then the system of equations (3.3)-
(3.4) has several solutions. Each solution corresponds to a stable matching of the matching 
market, i.e., there exist choice sets SsY and DdY that satisfy (3.3) and (3.4). 
 (ii) If agents choose their most preferred alternative from their respective choice sets  
{ }SsY  and { }DdY  (which satisfy (3.3) and (3.4) then the resulting matching will be stable.  
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. The proof actually contains an 
algorithm which generates the sets satisfying (3.3) and (3.4) for any given stable matching. 
The results obtained in Theorem 1 imply that matching behavior can be viewed as the 
outcome of separate one-sided discrete choice problems. Thus, it makes sense to denote the 
sets SsY  and DdY  equilibrium choice sets. To be precise, the series of choice problems defined 
by these agent- specific choice sets will give the same solutions as any matching game that 
produces a stable matching. The key point in our setup, as will become clearer later, is that 
Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) turn out to be a most useful link between the preferences and choice 
restrictions of agents from both sides of the market that will enable us to address the 
aggregation problem under equilibrium in a useful way. Note that although we used the 
modified Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm to show the existence of the stable matching, 
Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) and Theorem 1 is valid for all possible stable matchings and is not 
dependent on the actual matching algorithms that generate the matching outcome.   
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3.3. Observed heterogeneity and aggregated equilibrium conditions 
Above we allowed the agents to be heterogeneous with no other restrictions than preferences 
being fixed and strict. In practical empirical applications, however, only some of the relevant 
individual characteristics are observed by the analyst. In order to deal with heterogeneity in 
the analysis, we group agents into different types according to the observed characteristics. 
Agents within each type are observationally identical but may have different preferences. 
Similarly to the notation in Section 3.2 let ( , , )SsiU d j ω  be the utility of supplier s of observable 
type i of a match with demander d of observable type j at contract ,ω ( , , )DdjU s i ω  the utility of 
demander d of type j for a match with supplier s of type i at contract ,ω  and the respective 
utilities of being single. 
Let SiΩ be the set of suppliers of type i and 
D
jΩ  the set of demanders of type j. Define
( , , )Ssiy d j ω  and ( , , )
D
djy s i ω  as the extension of ( , )Ssy d ω  and ( , )Ddy s ω  defined above. Similarly, 
let { ( , , ), , , 1,2,...}S S Dsi si jy y d j W d jω ω= ∈ ∈Ω =  and { ( , , ), , , 1,2,...}D D Sdj jd iy y s i W s iω ω= ∈ ∈Ω = . We 
define the supply and demand index functions ( , , , )S Ssi siJ d j yω  and ( , , , )D Ddj djJ d i yω in an 
analogous way as in (3.1) and (3.2), namely as 
 
1 if ( , , ) max(max max max ( , , ) ( ), (0))   
( , , , )
0 otherwise,
D
r
S S S S
si si si siS S r v Wk
si si
U d j U k r v y k,r,v U
J d j y
ω
ω ∈∈Ω
 ≥= 

 
 
for all , , 1,2,...Djd W jω∈Ω ∈ = Similarly, we define ( , , , )
D D
dj djJ s j yω  as 
            
1 if ( ) max(max max max ( , , ) ( , ), (0)) 
( , )
0 otherwise,
S
r
D D D D
dj dj dj djD D r v Wk
dj dj
U s, j, U k r v y k r,v U
J s, j, y
ω
ω ∈∈Ω
 ≥= 

 
for all , , 1,2,...Sis W iω∈Ω ∈ =  
Similarly to (3.3) and (3.4), the equilibrium choice sets are determined by 
(3.5)                         ( , , ) ( , , , )D S Sdj si siY s i J d j Yω ω=   
and    
(3.6)                         ( , , ) ( , , , )S D Dsi dj djY d j J s i Yω ω=   
where SisY  and DdjY  represent the respective equilibrium choice sets of supplier s of type i and 
demander d of type j. Since the utility functions are random variables so are also the 
corresponding indicator functions, as well as the equilibrium choice sets.  
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4. Asymptotic aggregate equilibrium relations 
Given a matching market as described above, with flexible contracts and several observable 
types of agents, we shall in this section discuss asymptotic aggregate results, that is, aggregate 
equilibrium relations in “large” markets. The reason why we consider the case with large 
markets is that the more realistic case with smaller markets is too complicated to deal with. 
That is, we shall establish equilibrium relations for the number of matches between suppliers 
of a specific type and demanders of another specific type, as a function of the agents’ 
preferences and the fractions of agents of the respective observable types. Let iN  be the 
number of suppliers of type i and jM  the number of demanders of type j and let N be the total 
number of suppliers and M the total number of demanders.  
Let iN  be the number of suppliers of type i and jM  the number of demanders of type j and 
let N be the total number of suppliers and M the total number of demanders. Let 
( , ) { ( , , ), }S S Dsi si jY j Y d j dω ω= ∈Ω  and ( , ) { ( , , ), }.D D Sdj dj iY i Y s i sω ω= ∈Ω  Let C be a set consisting of 
non-negative variables and define || ||C  as the sum of the variables in C divided by the square 
root of the number of variables in C.  For example, we have that 
  1|| ( , ) || ( , , ).
D
j
S S
si si
d
Y j Y d j
N
ω ω
∈Ω
= ∑   
Due to (3.5) and (3.6) we get that under equilibrium the total number of suppliers of type i 
that are in the choice set of demander d of type j at contract ω , and the total number of 
demanders of type j that are in the choice set of supplier s of type i are determined by 
(4.1)     1( , ) || ( , , , )
S
i
D S S
dj ri ri
r
||Y i J d j Y
N
ω ω
∈Ω
= ∑    
and 
(4.2)     1( , ) || ( , , , ).
D
j
S D D
dj ri ri
r
||Y i J s i Y
N
ω ω
∈Ω
= ∑  
Note that it follows from Theorem 1 that there exist solutions to the equations in (4.1, 4.2). 
These relations represent aggregate equilibrium restrictions because they characterize the 
number of demanders of type j (suppliers of type i) in the equilibrium choice set of the 
supplier of type i (demander of type j). Note that they only yield necessary conditions for 
(3.5) and (3.6) to hold, and they may also hold in cases where the matching is unstable. Recall 
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also that there may be many different stable matchings for a given matching problem. Thus, 
the solutions to the relations in (4.1, 4.2) are not unique.  
 
Assumption 1 (Balanced Market) 
The ratios / ,M N κ→ / ,Si iN N λ→  /
D
j jM M λ→ tend towards positive finite constants, 
respectively, as .N →∞   
 
 Assumption 1 is needed to guarantee that when the population gets large, the market 
composition remains stable.  
4.1. Independent utilities  
We start our analysis by considering the simplest case where the preferences are independent. 
  
Assumption 2  
The utility functions have the structure 
        ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) / ( ),S S Ssi i siU d j a j d j b Nω ω ε ω=  ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) / ( ),
D D D
dj j djU s i a i s i b Nω ω ε ω=    
         (0) (0)S Ssi siU ε=   and  (0) (0)D Ddj djU ε=  
for .Wω∈  The terms ( , )Sia j ω  and ( , )
D
ja i ω  are positive and deterministic and the random 
variables, { ( , , )},Ssi d jε ω { ( , , )},
D
dj s iε ω { (0)}
S
siε  and { (0)}
D
djε  are all positive and independent. The 
four sets of random variables { ( , , )},Ssi d jε ω { ( , , )},
D
dj s iε ω { (0)}
S
siε  and { (0)}
D
djε  are generated 
from corresponding four, possibly different, c.d.f. The term ( )b N is a positive constant that is 
increasing in N.  
 
The components ( , )Sia j ω  and ( , )
D
ja i ω  are systematic terms, whereas the 
corresponding “error” terms represent unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. These error 
terms may capture the effect of variables that are perfectly known by the individual agent and 
also the effect of unpredictable fluctuations (to the individual agent) in tastes. The rationale 
for the latter interpretation is that individuals may have difficulties with evaluating the precise 
value (to them) of the alternatives, and may, therefore, revise their evaluations depending on 
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their psychological state of mind. However, it is important that the error terms remain 
unchanged sufficiently long to ensure that the matching algorithm is accomplished each time 
preferences are altered because otherwise, the matchings will not be stable. We may interpret 
the term ( )b N as representing the mean cost of search. The mean search cost will increase 
with market size (N) because the matching process in a large market will be costly and time-
consuming. This cost factor ensures that when the market becomes large, the probability of 
remaining unmatched will be bounded away from zero.  
Let 1 ( | , , )
SF u i j ω  denote the c.d.f. of ( , , ),Ssi d jε ω  1 ( | , , )
DF u j i ω  the c.d.f. of ( , , ),Ddj s iε ω  
0 ( | )
SF u i  the c.d.f. of (0)Ssiε  and 0 ( | )
DF u j  the c.d.f. of (0).Ddjε  
 
 Assumption 3  
 The c.d.f. 1 ( | , , ),
SF x i j ω 1 ( | , , )
DF x j i ω  and the sequence { ( )}b N   satisfy 
(i)    1
1
(1 ( | , , )) 1,
1 ( , , )
S
S t
x F xt i j
F t | i j
α ω
ω →∞
−
→
−
    1
1
(1 ( | , , )) 1
1 ( | , , )
D
D t
x F xt j i
F t j i
α ω
ω →∞
−
→
−
 
and 
(ii)  1(1 ( ( ) | , , )) 1
S
N
N F b N i j ω
→∞
− →  and 1(1 ( ( ) | , , )) 1.
D
N
N F b N j i ω
→∞
− →  
where 0α >  is a constant. Moreover,  
(iii)                    0 0( | ) ( )
S SF u i F u= , 0 0( | ) ( ),
D DF u j F u=   
(iv)  1(0)SsiEε − < ∞  and 1(0) .DdjEε − < ∞  
It follows from Extreme value theory that Assumption 3(i, ii) is equivalent to the 
property that the respective distribution functions of the error terms are in the domain of 
attraction of the extreme value distribution exp( ),x α−− 0,x >  see for example Proposition 1.11 
in Resnick (1987). The condition in Assumption 3(i, ii) is the weakest possible condition that 
assures that the weak limit of the maximum of independent random variables is a proper 
random variable defined on the positive real line. In our context we may, with no loss of 
generality, set 1.α = This normalization corresponds to applying a suitable power transform of 
the utility functions. Recall that we are dealing with ordinal comparisons so that utilities are 
only unique up to a monotone transformation. Assumption 3 is essentially equivalent to a 
similar assumption made by Menzel (2015). 
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Assumption 4 
The distributions of the utility of being single have the structure 
        0 0( | ) ( | ) exp( 1 / )
S DF u i F u j u= = −   
for positive u. 
 
Note that Assumption 4 implies Assumption 3(iv), namely that 1(0)SsiEε − < ∞  and 
1(0) .DdjEε
− < ∞  
Menzel (2015) assumes Assumption 4. To motivate this assumption he appeals to 
extreme value theory by assuming that there are a large number of «outside» elemental 
options with i.i.d. utilities and thus the most preferred one will have a utility that is the 
maximum of the utilities of the elemental options and therefore will be (asymptotically) 
extreme value distributed. However, even if this is the case, the distribution of the outside 
option may not be regularly varying at infinity with the same index α−  as the distributions of 
the utilities over potential partners and contracts.5 To ensure that the utility of the single 
option is regularly varying with the same index as the utilities of the respective matching 
options one needs to impose the restriction that the error terms of the single and the matching 
options have “similar” distributions. It is therefore of interest to develop a general framework 
that does not hinge on Assumption 4. Specifically, the outside option might involve a number 
of very different underlying alternatives. It is thus desirable to allow for general distributions 
of the utilities being single.  
 We are now ready to state the key result of this section. Let ( , )Si jϕ ω  be the 
(equilibrium) asymptotic probability that a given supplier of type i shall be matched with 
some demander of type j at contract ,ω  ( , )Dj iϕ ω  the asymptotic probability that a given 
demander of type j shall be matched with some supplier of type i, (0)Siϕ  the asymptotic 
probability that a supplier of type i shall remain single (self-matched), (0)Djϕ the asymptotic 
probability that a demander of type j shall remain single. Let ( , )Sim j ω  be the asymptotic size, 
divided by ,N  of the set of demanders of type j that are available to a supplier of type i at 
contract ω  in equilibrium and ( , )Djm i ω  the asymptotic size, divided by ,N  of the set of 
                                                     
5 See Resnick (1987), section 0.4 for a definition and discussion of regularly varying functions. 
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suppliers of type i that are available to a demander of type j at contract ω  in equilibrium. In 
“finite” populations these sizes will depend on the particular supplier and demander but it 
follows from the next theorem that the corresponding asymptotic sizes do not. Also, let
( )ijNX ω  denote the number of matches with contract ω  where the suppliers are of type i and 
the demanders are of type j, which is given by 
( ) ( , ) ( , , ) / .
S D
i j
S D
ij si dj
s d
X Y d, j Y s i Nω ω ω
∈Ω ∈Ω
= ∑ ∑   
 
 Theorem 2 
 Assume that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Then, with ( ) ,b N N=   
(4.3)            lim || ( , ) || ( , )S Ssi iN Y j m jω ω→∞ =    lim || ( , ) || ( , )
D D
dj jN
Y i m iω ω
→∞
=  
and 
(4.4)            lim ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )S S S Dij i i i jN X j m j m iω λ ϕ ω ω ω→∞ = =   
with probability 1 where ( , )Sim j ω  and ( , )Djm i ω  are positive deterministic terms. Moreover, 
the asymptotic choice probabilities are uniquely determined by the equations 
(4.5)    
( , ) ( , )( , ) ,
1 ( , ) ( , )
S S
S i i
i S S
i i
k v W
a j m jj
a k v m k v
ω ω
ϕ ω
∈
=
+∑∑
  ( , ) ( , )( , ) ,
1 ( , ) ( , )
D D
j jD
j D D
j j
k v W
a i m i
i
a k v m k v
ω ω
ϕ ω
∈
=
+∑∑
 
 
(4.6) 
1(0)
1 ( , ) ( , )
S
i S S
i i
k v W
a k v m k v
ϕ
∈
=
+∑∑
,    1(0)
1 ( , ) ( , )
D
j D D
j j
k v W
a k v m k v
ϕ
∈
=
+∑∑
,  
and 
(4.7) ( , ) ( , ) (0) ,S D D Di j j jm j a iω ω ϕ κλ=   ( , ) ( , ) (0) .
D S S S
j i i im i a jω ω ϕ λ=   
 
Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 7 (Section 5.5). Theorem 2 implies that the 
normalized sizes of the equilibrium choice sets, ( , )Sim j ω  and ( , )Djm i ω  in a large market are 
approximately non-stochastic.  
 In other words, the choice probabilities given in Theorem 2 are the same as in the case 
where the choice sets were exogenously given and of sizes ( , )Sim j Nω  and ( , ) ,Djm i Nω
respectively. As we shall see below, this property also holds in the more general case with 
general distributions of the utility functions and with the correlation between utilities across 
alternatives (potential partners). The interpretation is that when N is large the corresponding 
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equilibrium choice sets also become large. Since these choice sets of potential partners are 
large essentially every level of attractiveness of potential candidates will be represented in the 
choice sets.  
 The structure of the relations (4.3) to (4.7) clearly show the separate “one-sided” 
discrete choice feature of the model, namely that conditional on the (equilibrium) choice sets 
determined by (3.5) and (3.6), the choice probabilities in large matching markets have the 
conventional structure of the Luce model (McFadden, 1973) as if suppliers and demanders 
make “one-shot” discrete choices with exogenous individual choice sets, provided the market 
is large. Only aggregate endogeneity (aggregate equilibrium conditions) given in (4.7) needs 
to be accounted for. 
It is also of substantial interest that convergence is with probability one instead of the 
weaker concept of convergence in probability. Convergence with probability one means that 
if the population is sufficiently large it will always be true (almost surely) that the sizes of the 
choice sets divided by N  are approximately equal to their corresponding limiting values 
{ ( , ), ( , )},S Di jm j m iω ω  in contrast to the case of convergence in probability. Consider for 
example a number of matching “experiments” with large markets where the preferences are 
independent across experiments. If convergence were only in probability it could be the case 
that the asymptotic model would not necessarily hold in every experiment.  
The next result, which is equivalent to Theorem 2, is very useful in the context of 
identification and estimation. In particular, it shows in a more explicit way how the 
asymptotic choice probabilities are determined. 
 
Corollary 1 
 Assumptions 1 to 4 imply that 
(4.7) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (0) (0),S D S D S Di j i j i jj a j a iϕ ω λ κ ω ω ϕ ϕ=  ( , ) ( , ) / ,
D S S D
j i i ji jϕ ω ϕ ω λ κλ=   
(4.8) 
1(0)
1 (0)
S
i D D
ik k k
k
c
ϕ
ϕ λ κ
=
+∑
  and  1(0)
1 (0)
D
j S S
kj k k
k
c
ϕ
ϕ λ
=
+∑
  
where 
(4.9)   ( , ) ( , ).S Dij i j
v W
c a j v a i v
∈
= ∑  
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The equations in (4.9) represent another way of expressing the aggregate equilibrium 
conditions. Once the asymptotic choice probabilities have been determined the asymptotic 
normalized sizes of the choice sets can be recovered from (4.7). Thus, equations (4.8) and 
(4.9) imply that when the preference parameters ( , ) ( , )S Di ja j a iω ω  have been determined then 
one can simulate new aggregate equilibrium solutions under alternative population sizes of 
suppliers and demanders in the respective observable groups. Alternatively, in case the 
preference parameters depend on policy variables (such as costs and taxes) one can apply the 
relations above to simulate the effect of changes in these policy variables.  
It is also of interest to consider the conditional distribution of the realized contract 
given the realized matchings of suppliers and demanders in equilibrium. Let ( )ijg ω  denote the 
probability that a particular contract ω  is chosen by a supplier of type i and a demander of 
type j, given that they have realized a match with each other. From (4.8) we have that 
(4.11)  
( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , )( ) .
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
D S DS
j i ji
ij S D S D
i j i j
v W v W v W
i a j a ijg
j v i v a j v a i v
ϕ ω ω ωϕ ω
ω
ϕ ϕ
∈ ∈ ∈
= = =
∑ ∑ ∑
 
The formula in (4.11) is interesting because it suggests that the agents’ matching process can 
be viewed as if it were a two-stage decision: In the first stage the pair of agent decide whether 
to match with each other. At this stage, it is implicit that the contract is optimally chosen in 
the second stage. In the second stage, the matched pair chooses the contract by maximizing 
the Nash product ( , ) ( , ) ( ),S Di ja j a iω ω ξ ω  where ( ), ,Wξ ω ω∈  are random error terms that are 
independent and extreme value (Fréchet) distributed, that is, with c.d.f. exp( 1 / ), 0.x x− >  As is 
well known, the resulting choice probability 
( ( , ) ( , ) ( ) max ( , ) ( , ) ( ))S D S Di j x W i jP a j a i a j x a i x xω ω ξ ω ξ∈=  
is equal to the right-hand side of (4.11). 
 An interesting question is how fast the equilibrium choice probabilities converge to the 
corresponding asymptotic values. Dagsvik (2000) and Menzel (2015) report Monte Carlo 
simulation experiments that seem to suggest that the finite sample choice probabilities are 
rather close to the corresponding asymptotic ones for small and moderate market sizes. 
23 
4.2. Summary of the analytic approach 
In this section, we give a brief summary of the analytic approach which should be 
considerably easier to follow than the rigorous proofs in Appendix A. For simplicity we treat 
the case with only one observable category on each side of the market. Let Sh  and Dh  be 
functions defined by  
                   
1
1( , ) ( , )
N
S S S S
s s
s
h d y J d y
N =
= ∑

  and  
1
1( , ) ( , ).
M
D D D D
d d
d
h s y J d y
N =
= ∑

 
Recall that || ||DdY N  is the number of suppliers in the equilibrium choice set DdY  of demander 
d and || ||SsY N  is the number of demanders in the equilibrium choice set SsY  of supplier s. 
Recall that by  (4.1) and (4.2) it follows that 
(4.12)      || || ( , )D S SdY h d Y= 
     and    || || ( , ).S D DsY h s Y= 
 
Note that since Dh  and Sh  are stochastic functions it follows that || ||SsY  and || ||DdY  become 
stochastic. For fixed || ||Ssy  and || ||Ddy  define 
 (|| ||) lim ( , )S S S Ss s sNf y N EJ d y→∞=   and (|| ||) lim ( , ).
D D D D
d d dN
f y N EJ d y
→∞
=  
It follows from Lemma 6 in Appendix A that these limits exist and are finite. The reason why 
the expectations of ( , )S Ss sJ d y  and ( , )D Dd dJ d y  only depends on the respective sizes of the choice 
sets is that the random error terms in the utility functions are i.i.d. For any exogenous Sy

 and 
Dy

we prove in Appendix A that for any positive δ       
(4.13) 1| ( , ) (|| ||) |S S S Sssh d y N f y δ
−− <∑

   and    1| ( , ) (|| ||) |D D D Dddh s y N f y δ
−− <∑

 
for all Dy

and Sy

 with probability 1 provided N is sufficiently large. Let Sm and Dm be 
determined by the equations 
(4.14)        ( )S D Dm f m κ=   and   ( )D S Sm f m=   
where / .M Nκ =  Suppose for a moment that Df and Sf were contraction mappings. In that 
case, one can write  
(4.15a)     | (|| ||) ( ) | ||| || |S S S S S Ss sf Y f m c Y m− ≤ −   
and   
(4.15b)   | (|| ||) ( ) | ||| || |D D D D D Dd df Y f m c Y m− ≤ −  
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for some c, 0 1.c< <  From (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15a, b) it follows that for sufficiently 
large N, 
(4.16a)     1||| || | | ( , ) ( ) | | ( , ) (|| ||) |D D S S S S S S S Sd ssY m h d Y f m h d Y N f Y
−− = − ≤ − ∑    
  1 1| (|| ||) ( ) | max | ( , ) (|| ||) |
S
S S S S S S S S
s ss sy
N f Y f m h d y N f y− −+ − ≤ −∑ ∑
 
    
  1 1| (|| ||) ( ) | ||| || |S S S S S Ss ss sN f Y f m cN Y mδ
− −+ − ≤ + −∑ ∑      
               max ||| || |S Sssc Y mδ≤ + −     
and similarly 
(4.16b)             ||| || | max ||| || | .S S D Ds ddY m c Y mδ− ≤ + −  
When (4.16b) is inserted into (4.16a) it follows that  
  2max ||| || | max ||| || | .D D D Dd dd dY m c c Y mδ δ− ≤ + + −  
Since c < 1 the latter equation implies that  
(4.17)  2max ||| || | .1 1
D D
dd
cY m
c c
δ δ δ+
− ≤ =
− −
 
Since (4.17) holds for any 0δ >  with probability 1 if N is sufficiently large it follows that 
|| ( ) ||SY d converges towards Dm  with probability 1 as the population size increases without 
bounds. Similarly, it follows that || ||SsY  converges towards 
Sm  with probability 1. 
Accordingly, the equations in (4.6) can be interpreted as the asymptotic equilibrium 
conditions because in a large population Dm N ( )Sm N  is the number of suppliers 
(demanders) available to a given demander (supplier) and ( )D Df m N  ( ( ) )S Sf m Nκ  is the 
number of suppliers (demanders) that are available to a given demander (supplier), given their 
(equilibrium) choice sets. From Dagsvik (2000) and in more general cases covered in 
Appendix A we have that the equations above have a unique positive solution for Sm  and .Dm   
 The proof given in Appendix A is more complicated than the outline above because it 
is log Sf  and log Df  that are contraction mappings instead of Sf  and Df  but the basic idea 
and logic of the proof is similar to the outline given in this section.  
Similarly, we prove in Appendix A that X converges almost surely towards to the 
deterministic term .S Dm m  Since X can be interpreted as the fraction of suppliers that obtain a 
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match it follows that in the limit this fraction becomes the probability that a supplier shall 
obtain a match, namely .Sϕ  Thus, we have that .S S Dm mϕ =   
 Consider for example the special case where the utility functions are i.i.d. with Fréchet 
distributed error terms. In this case, it follows easily that 
(4.18)       ( )
1
S
S S
S S
af m
a m
=
+
 and    ( ) .
1
D
D D
D D
af m
a m
=
+
 
Since choice sets can be treated as if they were exogenous with deterministic sizes in large 
markets it follows that 
(4.19)   1(0)
1
S
S Sa m
ϕ =
+
   and   1(0)
1
D
D Da m
ϕ =
+
 
from which it follows, using (4.14) and (4.19) that 
(4.20)   (0)S D Dm aκ ϕ=     and    (0).D S Sm a ϕ=   
If we insert for Sm and Dm given in (4.20) into (4.19) we obtain that  
(4.21)   1(0)
1 (0)
S
Dc
ϕ
κϕ
=
+
   and    1(0)
1 (0)
D
Sc
ϕ
ϕ
=
+
 
where .S Dc a a=  Using (4.4) we obtain that (0) (0),S D S DX m m cκ ϕ ϕ= =  which shows that c can 
be recovered from the fractions of suppliers and demanders that remain unmatched (given ).κ  
However, without further information one cannot separate Sa from .Da  It follows readily from 
the relations above that the probability that a supplier shall obtain a match is determined by 
the following quadratic equation (see Dagsvik, 2000). 
   (1 )( )S S SS Ma aϕ κ ϕ ϕ− − =  
where 1 (0).S Sϕ ϕ= −  Note that the constrained supply and demand probabilities that follow 
from (4.21), and the subsequent relations given above, are the same as in the case where the 
choice sets were exogenously given and of sizes Sm N  and .Dm N  This feature also holds 
in the more general case with general distributions of the utility functions and with correlation 
between utilities across alternatives (potential partners).  
26 
5. Extensions  
5.1. Interdependent preferences across suppliers and demanders 
We now turn to the case where the utility functions are allowed to be interdependent. There 
are several and fundamental different types of interdependence. For example, utilities between 
suppliers and demanders may be correlated. Another type of interdependence arises when 
utilities across different potential partners are correlated. In this section, we consider the 
former case. To accommodate this extension we assume that the systematic terms of the 
utility functions depend on particular random effects in the following way, namely 
( , ) ( , ; ( ))S Si i sda j a j i, jω ω η=  and ( , ) ( , ; ( , ))D Dj j dsa i a i j iω ω η=  where { ( , )}sd i jη is an independent 
random effect that satisfies the following symmetry property, ( , ) ( , ).sd dsi j j iη η=  The 
interpretation of ( , )sd i jη  is as an affinity attribute that captures the latent attractiveness 
between supplier s and demander d. 
 
Assumption 5  
The utility functions have the multiplicative separable structure given in Assumption 2 
but the systematic terms ( , ; ( , ))Si sda j i jω η  and ( , ; ( , ))
D
j sda i i jω η  are allowed to depend on 
random effects { ( , )}sd i jη  that are independent of { ( , , )},
D
dj s iε ω { ( , , )},
S
si d jε ω { (0)}Ssiε  and 
{ (0)}.Ddjε  Moreover, 
1(0) ,SsiEε
− < ∞ 1(0) ,DdjEε
− < ∞ ( , ; ( , ))Si sdEa j i jω η < ∞  and ( , ; ( , )) .
D
j sdEa i i jω η < ∞  
We can now prove the following result. 
 
Theorem 3 
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 hold, conditional on { ( , )}.sd i jη  Then (4.6) and 
(4.7) hold with ijc  replaced by ijc  given by  
         ( ( , , ( , )) ( , , ( , )))S Dij i sd j sd
v W
c E a j v i j a i v i jη η
∈
= ∑  
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random effect. Moreover 
 ( , ) (0) (0) ( ( , , ( , )) ( , , ( , ))).S S D S Di i j i sd j sdj E a j i j a i i jϕ ω ϕ ϕ ω η ω η=  
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             The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix A.  
We shall now summarize the central idea behind Theorem 3. Note that in this case the utilities 
have a similar structure as in previous sections apart from the systematic terms which have the 
structure ( )S S sda a η=  and ( )D D sda a η=  where sd dsη η=  is a random effect that represents 
latent attractiveness between supplier s and demander d. Suppose for simplicity that the 
random effect is a discrete random variable with support being a finite set and with p.m.f. 
( ).g η  Then it follows, similarly to the derivations above, that the respective probabilities of 
being self-matched are given by 
(5.1)     1(0)
1 ( ( )) ( )
S
S D
k a k m k
ϕ
η
=
+ ∑
  and   1(0)
1 ( ( )) ( )
D
D S
k a k m k
ϕ
η
=
+ ∑
 
where ( )Sm k N ( ( )Dm k N ) is the asymptotic size of the choice sets of suppliers 
(demanders) conditional on ( ).sd kη η=  Similarly to (4.14) it follows that the asymptotic size 
of the choice set for demanders (suppliers) given the random effect η divided by N   is given 
by 
     ( ( ))( ) ( ( )) (0).
1 ( ( )) ( )
S
D S S
S D
r
a km k a k
a r m r
η
η ϕ
η
= =
+ ∑
 
Hence, the expected normalized size of the choice sets are given by 
(5.2)      ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) (0)D S Sm k g k a kη η ϕ=   and  ( ) ( ) ( ( )) (0).D D Dm k g k a kκ η ϕ=  
When inserting (5.2) into (5.1) we obtain the result in Theorem 3. Hence, the asymptotic 
formulas for the equilibrium choice probabilities are as before but with a different 
interpretation of c. 
5.2. Matching with limited information about the market 
The discussion above relies on the assumption that every agent in the market is able to rank 
order all the agents on the opposite side of the market. In many applications, this may be 
unrealistic. For example, in marriage and labor markets the suppliers (demanders) may have 
limited information about the population of demanders (suppliers) who may be located far 
away or may be in different social groups. To account for this phenomenon Menzel (2015) 
has proposed an interesting approach, similar to the two-stage process of Lee and Schwarz 
(2012). In his modified approach the matching process takes place in two stages. In the first 
stage, a subsample of suppliers and demanders meet (or gather information) at random and 
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independently of the realized matching outcomes. In the second stage, the matching takes 
place within the random subsample of those who have met. In order to establish stability 
(equilibrium) in this case, Menzel (2015) has introduced a modified matching market where 
the demanders (suppliers) could meet all the potential suppliers (demanders), but where the 
utilities of potential partners in the original market who have not met are set equal to zero. 
This modified market continues to satisfy all the assumptions made for a matching game in 
Section 2.1, with just one exception: it violates the assumption that preferences must be strict. 
However, this feature does not create any problem for the stability analysis since all these 
potential partners with whom the agent did not meet are ranked below the “single” option. 
Thus, Theorem 1 will still be valid. That is, the existence of the stable matching and 
equilibrium choice sets is still guaranteed.      
              Note, however, that one cannot apply the same argument as above to generalize the 
results of Theorems 2 and 3 to the case with this type of two-stage matching. The reason for 
this is that the utilities of the agents will be perfectly correlated across the two sides of the 
market in the modified market due to the fact that if demander d and supplier s do not meet, 
they both will set their utility of (s, d) equal to zero. Menzel (2015) briefly discussed this 
problem and correctly pointed out how the aggregate equilibrium relations can be modified so 
as to hold also in the two-stage case. However, although his conjecture about the equilibrium 
relations in the two-stage game is correct he does not provide a formal proof of these 
relations.  
             In the following, using a slightly modified definition of the constrained demand and 
supply functions, we are able to extend Theorems 3 and 4 to the case with two-stage 
matching.  
 
 Assumption 6 
 The matching process is a two-stage matching game, with meeting probability .ijπ   
             It is easy to realize that this two-stage setting can be viewed as a special case of 
Theorem 4, obtained by letting ( , )sd i jη  be a binary random variable which has outcome 1 
(corresponding to meeting) with probability ijπ  and outcome zero (corresponding to not 
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meeting) with probability 1 ijπ−  and where ( , ;0) ( , ;0) 0S Di ja j a iω ω= =  and ( , ;1) ( , ),S Si ia j a jω ω=
( , ;1) ( , ).D Dj ja i a iω ω=   
 
             Corollary 2 
 Assume a setting with two-stage matching and that Assumptions 1 to 4 and Assumption 
6 hold. Then 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (0) (0),S D S D S Di j ij i j i jj a j a iϕ ω λ κπ ω ω ϕ ϕ=  ( , ) ( , ) / ,
D S S D
j i i ji jϕ ω ϕ ω λ κλ=   
           
1(0)
1 (0)
S
i D D
ik k k
k
c
ϕ
ϕ λ κ
=
+∑
  and  1(0)
1 (0)
D
j S S
kj k k
k
c
ϕ
ϕ λ
=
+∑
  
where 
   ( , ) ( , ).S Dij ij i j
v W
c a j v a i vπ
∈
= ∑  
 
 In some cases, the meeting probabilities may be inversely proportionate to the 
population size. Consider for example the case where only one side of the market makes the 
selection of the respective subsamples. Specifically, suppose the demanders make the 
selection and assume that a demander of type j selects a subsample of size .jin  It seems 
reasonable to assume that jin  is independent of the population size provided the population is 
not too small. Hence, under random sampling it follows that / / .Sij ji i ji in N n Nπ λ= =  Thus, 
when Siλ  is constant it follows in this case that the meeting probabilities are inversely 
proportionate to N. It is interesting to note that in this case, that is, when ijπ  is inversely 
proportionate to N, there is no need to introduce the constant ( )b N  which was needed in 
Theorems 2, 3 and Corollary 1 to avoid that the asymptotic choice probabilities become 
degenerate. The intuition for this is that in the case of two-stage matchings the second stage 
population remains bounded when N increases. 
 In the next section, we consider a more general setting where utilities in the original 
market are allowed to be correlated across potential partners (but where utilities across the 
two sides of the market still remain independent). For simplicity, we only consider the 
original one stage setting. It is, however, straightforward to extend the following analysis to 
the settings discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
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5.3. Interdependent preferences across observationally identical potential  
partners  
In this section, we shall discuss the case where the utilities across different potential partners 
are correlated.  Thus, we allow the utilities to be dependent on particular random effects that 
accommodate the preference interdependence between potential alternatives. However, 
preferences of agents on different sides of the market are independent. This extension may be 
important both theoretically and empirically because of the restrictive nature of the IIA 
condition (equivalent to ii type I extreme value distributed error terms). To this end let 
( , ) ( , ; ( , ))S S Si i sia j a j z jω ω ω=  and ( , ) ( , ; ( , ))
D D D
j j dja i a i z iω ω ω=  where { ( , ), ( , )}S Dsi djz j z iω ω  are 
independent random effects. For example, ( , )Ssiz j ω  may be interpreted as representing latent 
attributes that are common to potential partners of type j, contract .ω  The variable ( , )Ssiz j ω  
may depend on supplier s of type i because different suppliers may value a given attribute 
differently. 
 
Assumption 7  
The utility functions have the multiplicative separable structure given in Assumption 2 
but the systematic terms ( , ; ( , ))S Si sia j z jω ω  and ( , ; ( , ))
D D
j dja i z iω ω  are allowed to depend on 
random effects { ( , ), ( , )}S Dsi djz j z iω ω  that are independent of { ( , , )}
D
dj s iε ω , { ( , , )}  ,
S
si d jε ω { (0)}Ssiε  
and { (0)}.Ddjε   
Moreover, ( , ; ( , )) ,S Si siEa j z jω ω < ∞ ( , ; ( , )) ,D Dj djEa i z iω ω < ∞ 1(0)SsiEε − < ∞  and 
1(0) .DdjEε
− < ∞  
 
 Theorem 4 
Assume that Assumption 1 and Assumptions 3 to 7 hold. Then 
            lim || ( , , ) || ( , ),D Sj iN Y s i m jω ω→∞ =    lim || ( , , ) || ( , )
S D
i jN
Y d j m iω ω
→∞
=  
and 
           lim ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )S S S Dij i i i jN X j m j m iω ϕ ω λ ω ω→∞ = =   
with probability 1 where the asymptotic choice probabilities are given by 
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 ( , ; ( , )) ( , )( , ) ,
1 ( , ; ( )) ( , )
S S S
S i si i
i S S S
i si i
k v W
a j z j m jj E
a k v z k,v m k v
ω ω ω
ϕ ω
∈
 
 =  
+ 
 
∑∑
  ( , ) ( , ) / ,D S S Dj i i ji jϕ ω ϕ ω λ κλ=   
1(0) ,
1 ( , ; ( , )) ( , )
S
i S S S
i si i
k v
E
a k v z k v m k v
ϕ
 
 =  
+ 
 
∑∑
 1(0)
1 ( , ; ( , )) ( , )
D
j D D D
j dj j
k v
E
a k v z k v m k v
ϕ
 
 =  
+ 
 
∑∑
  
and where { ( , ), ( , )}S Di jm j m iω ω  are uniquely determined by the equations 
    
( , ; ( , ))
( , )
1 ( , ; ( , )) ( , )
S S D
i si jD
j S S S
i si i
k v W
a j z j
m i E
a k v z k v m k
ω ω κλ
ω
ω
∈
 
 =  
+ 
 
∑∑
 
  and 
 
( , ; ( , ))
( , ) .
1 ( , ; ( , )) ( , )
D D S
j dj iS
i D D D
j dj j
k v
a i z i
m j E
a k v z k v m k v
ω ω λ
ω
 
 =  
+ 
 
∑∑
 
 
The expectation in the relations above is taken with respect to the random effects in 
the systematic parts of the utility functions. Theorem 4 follows from more general results 
which are proved in Appendix A.  
We see immediately the similarity between Theorem 5 and Theorem 3, as the result in 
Theorem 5 follow by taking the expectation of the expressions that are analogous to the ones 
in (4.2) to (4.4) with respect to the random components of the systematic terms in the utility 
functions.  
Next, we shall discuss the implications of a particular assumption about random 
effects in the utility functions.  
 
 Assumption 8  
The utility functions have the structure 
      1/ /2( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) / ,S S S Ssi i si siU d j a j z j d j N
θ θω ω ω ε ω=  1/ /2( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) / ,D D D Ddj j dj djU s i a i z i s i N
θ θω ω ω ε ω=  
              (0) (0) (0)S S Ssi si siU z ε=  and  (0) (0) (0)
S S S
si si siU z ε=  
where { ( , , ), ( , , ), (0), (0)}S D S Ssi dj si sid j s iε ω ε ω ε ε  are independent positive random variable with c.d.f. 
exp( 1 / ), 0,x x− >  and { ( , ), ( , ), (0), (0)}S S S Dsi dj si djz j z i z zω ω  are independent and identically distributed 
32 
random variables that are generated by a stable distribution6 that is totally skew to the right 
and with index ,θ 1.θ ≤ 7  
 
In Appendix B, we show that Assumption 8 implies that the joint distribution of the 
random error terms of the utility functions has the structure of a particular multivariate 
extreme value distribution (type I). Moreover, it follows from well-known results (McFadden, 
1984) that the corresponding choice model has a nested multinomial logit structure. 
Moreover, if demanders d and r are of the same type, say they are of type j, then  
  ( ) 2log ( , , ), log ( , , ) 1 .S Ssi siCorr U d j U r jω ω θ= −  
Similarly, if suppliers s and k are of same type (i) then 
    ( ) 2log ( , , ), log ( , , ) 1 .D Ddj djCorr U s i U k iω ω θ= −  
Otherwise ( , , )SsiU d j ω  and ( , , )
S
siU r k ω′  are independent if ( , , ) ( , , )d j r kω ω′≠  and ( , , )
D
djU s i ω  is 
independent of ( , , )DdjU k r ω′  if ( , , ) ( , , ).s i r kω ω′≠  Thus, Assumption 8 implies that the 
preferences of a given agent are correlated across potential candidates of the same type and 
given contracts, but independent across contracts and across agents of different types.  
 
 Theorem 5 
 Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 8 it follows, as ,N →∞  that || ( , , ) ||,DjY s i ω || ( , , ) ||SiY d j ω  
and ( )ijX ω  converge to unique equilibrium values ( , ),Sim j ω ( , )Djm i ω and ( , ) ( , ),S Di jm j m iω ω
respectively, and the asymptotic choice probabilities are uniquely determined by 
  
1/(2 )( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ) (0) (0) ) / ,S S D S D S D Si i j i j i j ij a j w a i w
θϕ ω ϕ ϕ λ λ κ λ−=  
                    ( , ) ( , ) / ,D S D Sj i j ii jϕ ω ϕ ω λ κ λ=  
 
  
 ( )
( ) ( )
(1 )/(2 )
1/(2 )
(1 )/(2 ) 1/(2 )(0)
(0) ( ) (0)
S
iS
i S S D D
i i ik k k
k
θ θ
θ
θ θ θ
λ
ϕ
ϕ λ ζ θ ϕ λ κ
− −
−
− − −=
+∑
 
and 
 
                                                     
6 Recall that the stable distribution follows from an extended version of the Central limit theorem. See Samorodnitsky and 
Taqqu (1994) for a description of stable distribution. 
7 The case where 1θ = corresponds to a degenerate stable distribution with all mass located at zero. 
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( )
( ) ( )
(1 )/(2 )
1/(2 )
(1 )/(2 ) 1/(2 )(0)
(0) ( ) (0)
D
jD
j D D S S
j j kj k k
k
θ θ
θ
θ θ θ
λ κ
ϕ
ϕ λ κ ζ θ ϕ λ
− −
−
− − −=
+∑
 
 where 
 
  
1/(2 )( ) ( ( , ) ( , )) .S Dij i j
w W
a j w a i w θζ θ −
∈
= ∑   
 
            The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix B.  
From Theorem 5 it follows that the p.d.f. of the realized contract, given that the 
matched pair of supplier and demander are of type i and j, respectively, is given by 
1/(2 )
1/(2 )
( ( , ) ( , ))( , )( )
( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ))
S DS
i ji
ij S S D
i i j
v W v W
a j a ijg
j v a j v a i v
−
−
∈ ∈
= =
∑ ∑
θ
θ
ω ωϕ ωω
ϕ
. 
which, similarly to (4.9),  is equal to  
        2 2( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) )S D S Di j i x W i j iP a j a i j a j x a i x j xθ θω ω ξ ω ξ− −∈=  
where ( , ),i jξ ω  Wω∈  are independent with standard Fréchet c.d.f. For later reference it is of 
interest to consider the results of Theorem 6 in the limiting case when 0.θ →  In this limiting 
case, we have that, for any given contract; the agents are “almost” indifferent among potential 
partners of the same type.  
 
Corollary 3 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 6 the limiting choice probabilities as 0θ →  are 
given by 
(5.1)    ( , ) (0) (0) (0) / ,S S D D Si ij i j j ijϕ ω ζ ϕ ϕ λ κ λ=  
(5.2)     1 (0) (0) (0) /
(0)
S D D D
i ik k k iS
ki
ϕ ζ ϕ λ κ λ
ϕ
− =∑     
and    
(5.3)  1 (0) (0) (0) /
(0)
D S S D
j kj k k jD
kj
ϕ ζ ϕ λ κλ
ϕ
− =∑  
where 
(5.4)   (0) ( , ) ( , ).S Dij i j
w W
a j w a i wζ
∈
= ∑  
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5.4. The transferable case 
Shapley and Shubik (1972), and Becker (1973) introduced the transferable utility assumption. 
In this case, it is assumed, upon a match between a supplier and demander, that a part of the 
utility of one of the agents in the pair is transferred to the other in order to compensate for 
participation in the match. Apart from Dagsvik (2000) and Menzel (2015), matching models 
are usually based on a version of the transferable utility assumption pioneered by Choo and 
Siow (2006). In our notation, Choo and Siow (2006) assume the following assumption about 
preferences:   
 ( , , ) exp( ) ( ),S Ssi ij siU d j jω α ω ε=    ( , , ) exp( ) ( ),
D D
dj ji djU s i iω β ω ε= −  
                (0) (0)S Ssi siU ε=      and  (0) (0).
D D
dj djU ε=  
The assumption above means that potential partners within the same observational groups are 
perfect substitutes. Provided the stochastic error terms are independent with c.d.f. exp( 1 / )x−  
for positive x, we show in Appendix C that the equilibrium relations of the model of Choo and 
Siow (2006) are determined by the relations8 
(5.5)           ( ) (0) (0) / ,S S D D Si ij ji i j j ijϕ α β ϕ ϕ λ κ λ=  
(5.6)           1 (0) (0) /
(0)
S D D S
i ik ki k k iS
ki
ϕ α β ϕ λ κ λ
ϕ
− =∑    
and 
(5.7)           1 (0) (0) / .
(0)
D S S D
j kj jk k k jD
kj
ϕ α β ϕ λ λ κ
ϕ
− =∑    
It follows from Decker et al. (2013) that a solution of (5.6) and (5.7) exists and is unique. This 
result also follows from Theorem 4 of Dagsvik (2000). By inspection of the formulas in (5.5) 
to (5.7) we note that they are exactly the same as the ones in (5.1) to (5.4) given in Corollary 
3, with ( )Sij ia jα =  and ( ).
D
ji ja iβ =  As a result, the next theorem follows: 
 
  
                                                     
8 Choo and Siow (2006) express the equilibrium relations of their model in a different way. Note also that here we use the 
matching probabilities ( )Si jϕ  while Choo and Siow (2006) used the actually number of matched individuals ij .µ Noting the 
relations 0 (0),
S
i i iNµ ϕ= 0 (0)
D
j j jMµ ϕ=  and ( ),
S
ij i iN jµ ϕ=  we see immediately that these two equations are exactly the 
same.  
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Theorem 6 
The transferable model by Choo and Siow (2006) is equivalent to the structure of a 
limiting case of the general non-transferable model without flexible contracts given in 
Corollary 3, obtained when the correlation between the taste-shifters of the potential partners 
within each observed category is close to one. 
 
 Theorem 6 shows that it is possible to interpret the model of Choo and Siow (2006) 
and similar models in the literature as a special case of our NTU framework. 
 An interesting question is whether the transferable model fits the data better or worse 
than the non-transferable model. Consider the case without contracts. In the transferable case, 
it follows from (5.5) that  
      
2( ) .
(0) (0)
S S
i i
ij ij ji S D D
i j j
jc ϕ λα β
ϕ ϕ λ κ
= =   
Equations (5.5) to (5.7) place no additional restrictions on the parameters { }.ijc  Similarly, in 
the non-transferable case it follows from Corollary 2 for the special case without contracts 
that  
     ( )( ) ( )
(0) (0)
S
S D i
ij ij i j S D D
i j j
jc a j a i ϕπ
ϕ ϕ λ κ
= = . 
We state this result in the next corollary. 
 
 Corollary 4 
 In a single cross-section, the transferable and the non-transferable models both fit the 
data perfectly. 
5.5. More general distributional assumptions  
The results of Theorem 2 were obtained under Assumption 1 to 4. It is, however, possible to 
obtain analogous results under weaker assumptions, namely in the case where Assumption 4 
is dropped.   
 
 Theorem 7 
Assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 6 hold. Let 
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0
0
( ) exp( ) (1 / ) ,rr x xv F v dvψ
∞
= −∫  
for , .r S D=  Then the asymptotic choice probabilities are uniquely determined by the 
equations 
              ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ,S S D S D Di i j S i D j jj a j a i A Aϕ ω ω ω ψ ψ λ κ=    
             (0) 1 ( )S S Si i S iA Aϕ ψ= −  and (0) 1 ( ),D D Dj j D jA Aϕ ψ= −   
where SiA and DjA are uniquely determined by the equations 
     ( ) ,S D Di ik D k k
k
A c Aψ λ κ=∑   ( ) ,D S Sj kj S k k
k
A c Aψ λ=∑   
and 
  ( ( , , ( , )) ( , , ( , ))).S Dij ij i j
v W
c E a j v i j a i v i jπ η η
∈
= ∑  
for all i  and j and .Wω∈  
  
The proof of Theorem 7 is implied by Lemma 7 which is proved in Appendix A.  
Thus, we have obtained that even in the case where we only make weak regular assumptions 
about the distributions of the utilities it is possible to obtain an analytic expression for the 
equilibrium choice probabilities. After introducing Assumption 4 we mentioned that similarly 
to Menzel (2015), one could, for example, use extreme value theory to motivate the 
assumption that utilities of the outside options are extreme value distributed in a more general 
way than in Assumption 4, namely, as 10 ( | ) exp( )
SF u i u α−= −  and 20 ( | ) exp( ),
SF u j u α−= −  for 
positive u, 1α  and 2.α  
The result of Theorem 7 can also be extended to allow for the type of random effects 
given in Assumption 7. 
Similarly to the results obtained in previous sections Theorem 7 implies that one can 
analyze choice behavior in large two-sided matching markets as if each side of the market 
were stochastically independent with deterministic sizes of the equilibrium choice sets of 
available potential partners that only depend on the observed characteristics of the agents. 
However, the sizes of these choice sets are determined by particular aggregate equilibrium 
equations that depend on the distribution of preferences of the agents in the market as well as 
of the number of agents of each type in the market. 
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6. Estimation  
In this section, we shall consider estimation procedures when different types of data are 
available. We shall base our discussion of the framework given in Section 5.2. 
 
Case I: Information of the whole market is available 
In this case, the analyst has data for the behavior of all agents in the market as well as the 
population sizes of each group of agents. And for each matched pair; we observe their types 
and realized contracts. 
 Recall that ( )ijX Nω  is the number of matches with contract ω  where the suppliers are 
of type i and the demanders are of type j, and let 0
S
iNX  and 0
D
jNX  be the number of single 
suppliers of type i and demanders of type j, respectively. When the population is large:
( ) ( , ),S Sij i iX jω λ ϕ ω≅ 0 (0)
S S S
i i iX λ ϕ≅  and 0 (0).
D D D
j j jX κλ ϕ≅  Hence, it follows from Corollary 3 
that 
(6.1) 
0 0
( )
( , ) ( , ).ij S Dij i jS D
i j
NX
a j a i
X X
ω
π ω ω≅  
 
 
The relation in (6.1) is convenient in an empirical context because it allows us to recover the 
structural parameters { ( , ) ( , )}S Dij i ja j a iπ ω ω  from data on the number of realized matches of 
each type and the number of single suppliers and demanders of each type in a very simple 
way. Since the populations are large (6.1) will provide precise estimates of these parameters. 
We see immediately that only the product of the meeting probability and the individual mean 
utilities, ( , ) ( , ),S Dij i ja j a iπ ω ω  can be identified. Without further restrictions on the individual 
preferences or extra information, one cannot separately identify ijπ and the mean individual 
preferences ( , )Sia j ω  and ( , ).
D
ja i ω  The empirical analysis of Dagsvik et al. (2001) is based on 
the special case of (6.1) when no flexible contract is available. Choo and Siow (2006) apply 
the analogous relation that follows from their transferable model.  
 
Case II: A random sample of agents from one side of the market is available 
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In this case, we only observe a random sample from one side of the market (for example the 
supply side) but we know the fractions of each subgroup of agents { , }S Di jλ κλ  and observe a 
sample of suppliers. For each supplier, we observe whether she or he is matched, and if 
matched the type of her or his partner and the realized contract.  
For supplier s of type i in the sample define ( , ) 1,SsiD j ω =  if the supplier is matched 
with a demander of type j at contract ,ω  and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let (0) 1,SsiD =  if the 
supplier is self-matched, and ( ) ( , ),Sij sisNZ D jω ω=∑ , 0,i j >  the number of suppliers of type i in 
the sample that are matched to a demander of type j at contract ,ω 0
S
iNZ  the number of 
suppliers of type i that are self-matched. Also, let ( ) log ( , ) log ( , ) log .S Dij i j ijv a j a iω ω ω π= + +  
Hence, the loglikelihood function, in this case, can be written as 
(6.2) 
0
,
( , ) log ( , ) (0) log (0)
( ) log ( , ) log (0).
S S S S
si i si i
s j
S S S
ij i i i
i j i
logL D j j D
Z j Z
ω
ω
ω ϕ ω ϕ
ω ϕ ω ϕ
 
= +  
 
= +
∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑
 
 
Due to Corollary 2 the equation in (6.2) can be written as 
 
, ,
( ) ( ) log (0) ( ) log (0)S S Dij ij i i ij j
i j W i i j W
logL Z v Z
ω ω
ω ω λ ϕ ω ϕ
∈ ∈
= + +∑∑ ∑ ∑∑     
(6.3) ,
,
( ) ( ) log 1 exp( ( )) (0)
( ) log (0).
S D D
ij ij i ik k k
i j W i k z W
D
ij j
i j W
Z v v z
Z
ω
ω
ω ω λ ϕ λ κ
ω ϕ
∈ ∈
∈
 
= − + 
 
+
∑∑ ∑ ∑∑
∑∑
 
 
Case III: A random sample of suppliers and demanders is available  
The difference between case II and case III is that in case II we do not observe the number of 
demanders of each type that are self-matched, in contrast to case III. As in case II we observe 
the population fractions, In this case, it follows, similarly to (6.3), that  
(6.4)
  
0 0
,
( ) log ( , ) log (0) log (0)S S S D Dij i i i j j
i j i j
logL Z j Z Z
ω
ω ϕ ω ϕ ϕ= + +∑∑ ∑ ∑  
,
( ) ( ) log (0) log (0)S S D Dij ij j i j j
i j i j
Z v
ω
ω ω λ ϕ κλ ϕ= + +∑∑ ∑ ∑    
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,
( ) ( ) log 1 exp( ( )) (0)
log (0).
S D D
ij ij i ik K k
i j W i k z W
D
j jD
j
Z v v z
ω
ω ω λ ϕ κλ
κλ ϕ
∈ ∈
 
= − + 
 
+
∑∑ ∑ ∑∑
∑
 
Due to the nonlinearity of the restrictions in Corollary 3 it may be cumbersome to maximize 
(6.3) or (6.4) by a direct approach. One and alternatively use an iterative approach to compute 
the likelihood function. Let n be the n-th step in the iteration procedure of computing the 
probabilities of being self-matched and define 
, 1
,
1(0)
1 exp( ( )) (0)
D
j n n S S
kj k n k
k z W
v z
ϕ
ϕ λ+
∈
=
+∑∑
  and  ,
,
1(0)
1 exp( ( )) (0)
S
i n n D D
ik k n k
k z W
v z
ϕ
ϕ κλ
∈
=
+∑∑
, 
where ( )nijv ω  denotes the estimate of ( )ijv ω  obtained at the n-th step. As starting values of the 
demander probabilities of being self-matched one can use the fractions of self-matched de-
manders.  
7. Measures of welfare and gain from a match 
In this section, we shall discuss measures of welfare. For simplicity, we only consider the 
two-stage case of Section 5.2 in the special case with no flexible contracts. There are several 
ways of computing welfare measures in random utility models. One way is to compute 
Compensating Variation (CV) or Equivalent Variation (EV) measures derived from the 
individual random utility formulation. Recall, however, that one cannot identify preferences 
of suppliers and demanders separately without further assumptions or data on preference 
rankings. Consequently, separate welfare measures for suppliers (demanders) cannot be 
evaluated without additional data or theory. In the case where money is not involved, it is not 
possible to compute money metric welfare measures. However, it is possible to compute some 
measures of total gain for the pair of getting matched.  
The first measure we consider for the total gain of a match is 
(7.1) (log ( , )) (log ( , )) log ( ) log ( ) logS D S Dsi dj i j ijE U d j E U s i a j a i π+ = + +   
The formula in (7.1) expresses the total mean utility of the suppliers of type i for being 
matched to a demander of type j, and demanders of type j of being matched to a supplier of 
type i. It can be computed because { ( ) ( ) }S Di j ija j a i π  is identified and can thus be recovered 
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from data. This measure is similar to the one proposed by Choo and Siow (2006). Recall that 
the systematic terms of the utility functions for the single options are normalized to one.  
Next, consider an analogous measure which is based on the highest utility an agent can 
achieve under equilibrium. From the assumptions in Section 4, it follows asymptotically that 
(7.2)   (log(max( ( , ) ( , ))) ) exp( ( ) ( )exp( ))
D
j
S D S S
si dj i i
d
P U d j Y s i u a j m j u
∈Ω
≤ = − −   
  exp( ( ) ( ) (0) exp( )).S D D Dij i j j ja j a i uπ ϕ κλ= − −  
Consequently, using Corollary 3 it follows that 
(7.3)         (log(max max( ( , ) ( , ))) ) exp( ( ) ( )exp( ))
D
j
S D S S
si dj i ijj d
P U d j Y s i u a j m j u
∈Ω
≤ = − −∑  
         1 (0)exp( ( ) ( ) (0) exp( )) exp exp( ) .
(0)
S
S D D D i
ij i j j j Sj
i
a j a i u uϕπ ϕ κλ
ϕ
 −
= − − = − ⋅ − 
 
∑  
From (7.3) we get that (apart from an additive constant)  
(7.4)                  1 (0)(log (max max( ( , ) ( , ))) log .
(0)Dj
S
S D i
si dj Sdj i
E U d j Y s i ϕ
ϕ∈Ω
 −
=  
 
 
The interpretation of the expression in (7.4) is as the mean of the highest utility suppliers of 
type i can attain from a match with available demanders of type j. It is of interest to consider 
the interpretation of log max ( ( , ) ( , ))D
j
S D
si djd U d j Y s i∈Ω  further. This is the highest utility supplier s 
can obtain. As discussed by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), this value depends on the actual 
matching rules. For example, given the Deferred-Acceptance algorithm with suppliers making 
the offers, it is the highest utility supplier s that can be attained among all matching 
algorithms that produce stable matchings. In contrast, it is the lowest value supplier s will 
attain among all algorithms that produce stable matchings in the case where the demanders 
are making the offers. Similarly, it follows that 
(7.5)         1 (0)(log(max max ( ( , ) ( , )) | ) log .
(0)
S
i
D
jD S D
i dj si j Ds
j
E U s i Y d j d
ϕ
ϕ∈Ω
 −
∈Ω =   
 
 
The expressions in (7.4) and 7.5) show, however, that the mean indirect utility of being 
matched, expressed as the logarithm of the odds ratio between the probability of obtaining a 
match and the probability of remaining unmatched, is independent (asymptotically) of the 
matching algorithm. Note that it is implicit in (7.4) that supplier s is choosing her or his most 
preferred partner from the (endogenous) set of available potential partners. As we see from 
the formulas above, these results stem from the fact that the asymptotic equilibrium choice 
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probabilities are independent of the actual matching rules. In finite populations, this might not 
be true. 
 The welfare measures given above can be used to make ordinal comparisons of the 
welfare effect from different reforms, or from changes in the fractions of suppliers or 
demanders in specific population groups. Due to fact that our model is an equilibrium one it 
might not be clear, a priori, how different regimes compare in terms of welfare because the 
two sides of the market may have conflicting interests.  
In the case where money is involved, it is also possible to compute money metric 
welfare measures such as Compensating Variation (CV) and Equivalent Variation (EV).  
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed a non-transferable structural equilibrium framework suitable 
for empirical analysis of matching markets. Similarly to Dagsvik (2000), our approach is 
based on the notion of constrained supply and demand, conditional on the choice set of 
potential partners. This setup does not mean that the agents are assumed to know their 
equilibrium choice sets. On the contrary, this setup is to be interpreted as an “as if” rationale 
and serves only as an analytic device that turns out to be convenient for obtaining aggregate 
analytic results.  
We have demonstrated that one can obtain aggregate equilibrium relations for the 
resulting number of matched pairs (and singles) under rather weak assumptions about the 
agents’ utility functions. This includes the cases where an agent’s utilities are correlated 
across alternatives (potential partners) and where a supplier’s (demander’s) utilities of a 
supplier and a demander are correlated. A special case of the latter representation allows for 
agent-pair-specific random submarkets (interview stage), consistent with agents meeting 
potential partners at random in a first stage, and subsequently participate in the matching 
game in a second stage within the submarkets obtained in the first stage. We believe that this 
two-stage model extension is very important because it increases the realism of the model 
dramatically. Another new and particularly interesting finding is that the transferable 
matching model can be interpreted as a limiting case of a corresponding non-transferable 
model with correlated preferences, as the correlation between an agent’s utilities of different 
potential partners of the same type approaches one.  
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Appendix A 
Lemmas and proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider the modified Deferred-Acceptance algorithm. At each step, at least one offer is made by 
some demander; otherwise, the algorithm will stop at this stage. Since there is only a finite set of 
possible offers, it follows that this algorithm will stop after a finite number of stages. It is obvious that 
no single agent will block the matching since the algorithm ensures that only those offers ranked 
higher than the single option will be accepted by the agent. It remains to show that there is no any 
combination ( , , )s d ω  that will block the matching. Assume this is not true, and that at the end of game 
supplier s is matched to demander d at contract ,ω  demander d is matched to the supplier s  at 
contract ,ω  but supplier s and demander d both prefer each other at contract ω  to their current 
matching. Thus, supplier s  ranks combination ( , )d ω  higher than ( , )d ω  and demander d ranks 
combination ( , )s ω higher than ( , ).s ω  Since d ranks ( , )s ω higher than ( , ),s ω  it must be true that d 
has offered ω  to s during the matching game. Since d is not matched to s at contract ,ω  it must be the 
case that s has rejected his offer at some previous step, which means that s had a better offer than 
( , ).d ω  This means that s prefers ( , )d ω  to ( , )d ω , which is a contradiction. Assume next that s and d 
are matched to one another at contract ω  but both prefer contract .ω′  Then demander d must have 
offered contract ω′  to supplier s at some previous step and supplier s must have rejected this offer at 
that step. Hence, this case also leads to a contradiction. Thus, we have proved the result stated in 
Proposition 1. 
            Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1  
It is obvious that if we can prove (ii), (i) follows readily. So, in the following, we will provide only the 
proof for (ii).  
Proof of (i):  
Since preferences are strict, it follows from Proposition 1 that stable matchings exist. For any given 
stable matching, let ( )kµ denote a vector function that matches agent k to his chosen combination of 
supplier and contract, i.e., 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ))d d dµ µ µ=  where 1( )dµ  is the supplier demander d is matched to 
and 2 ( )dµ the corresponding contract. If demander d is self-matched (remaining single) we define 
( ) (0 0)d , .µ =  We claim that the following definition yields equilibrium choice sets: Let ( , ) 0SsY d ω =  
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if ( , ) ( ( ))S Ss sU d U sω µ≥  and ( , ) 1
S
sY d ω =  if ( , )d ω = ( ).sµ  Consider next the case where
( , ) ( ( )),S Ss sU d U sω µ<  Set ( , ) 0
S
sY d ω =  if and only if d prefers ( )dµ to ( ).s,ω  Otherwise, set 
( , ) 1SsY s ω = . The indicator function ( , )
D
dY s ω is defined in a similar way. 
Now it remains to show that the choice sets given by this construction satisfy (3.3) and (3.4).   
Case A: Supplier s and demander d are matched together with contract ω  in the stable matching. i.e  
( ) ( , )d sµ ω=  and ( ) ( , )s dµ ω= . From the analysis above we know that ( , ) 1.SsY d ω =  On the other 
hand, we also know from the analysis above that an alternative ( , )s ω∗ ∗ which is ranked above 
( ) ( , )d sµ ω=  by demander d is not in d’s choice set, i.e. ( , ) 0.DdY s ω
∗ ∗ = By definition (3.2), this 
implies that ( )) 1D Dd dJ s, ,Y ,ω = implying that (3.4) holds. To verify that (3.3) is done in a similar way. 
 
Case B: Supplier s and demander d are not matched together with contract ω  in the stable matching. 
i.e., ( ) ( ).d sµ µ≠  If ( , ) ( ( ))S Ss sU d U sω µ≥  then by definition of stable matching, we must have
( , ) ( ( ))D Dd dU s U dω µ< . Otherwise, both supplier s and demander d will be better off by switching to 
the match ( , , ).s d ω  Hence, ( , ) 0SsY d ω = . On the other hand, since we have ( , ) ( ( ))
D D
d dU s U dω µ<  this 
implies that ( )) 0D Dd dJ s, ,Y .ω =  Thus, (3.4) is satisfied in this case.  
          Consider next the case where ( , ) ( ( ))S Ss sU d U sω µ<  and ( , ) ( ( )).
D D
d dU s U dω µ>  In this case it 
follows that ( , ) 1.SsY d ω = Furthermore, it follows that ( ) 1
D D
d dJ s, ,Yω =  because ( , ) ( ( ))
D D
d dU s U dω µ>  
and the fact that an alternative ( , )s ω that is ranked above ( )dµ  by demander d is not in d’s choice set. 
Hence, (3.4) is satisfied also in this case.  
          Consider next the case where ( , ) ( ( ))S Ss sU d U sω µ<  and ( , ) ( ( )).
D D
d dU s U dω µ< In this case we 
have that ( , ) 0.SsY d ω =  Furthermore, it follows from the inequality ( , ) ( ( ))
D D
d dU s U dω µ< that
( )) 0D Dd dJ s, ,Yω =  and the fact that ( )dµ  is always in d’s choice set. Thus, (3.4) is satisfied. 
Similarly, we can prove that (3.3) also is satisfied by our above construction of choice sets.  
 
Proof of (ii):  
Assume that SsY  and 
D
dY  satisfy (3.3) and (3.4). Suppose furthermore that the most preferred option of 
supplier s within her choice set is a match with d at ,ω  i.e., ( , , ) 1S Ss sJ d Yω =  and ( , ) 1.
S
sY d ω =  Since 
( , ) 1SsY d ω = (3.4) implies that ( , , ) 1.
D D
d dJ s Yω = Thus, we have demonstrated that if s prefers a match 
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with d at contract ω , then (3.3) and (3.4) imply that d prefers a match with s atω  as well. In other 
words, if the agents’ choices satisfy (3.3) and (3.4) a matching is induced.  
 It remains to show that this matching also is stable. First, we claim that under (3.3) and (3.4) 
there is no option that blocks the matching. Suppose for a moment that this is not true and that 
( , , )s d ω  blocks the matching. Then obviously ( , )d ω  cannot be in the choice set of supplier s because 
otherwise, s would have formed a match with d atω  already since we have shown above that rational 
behavior will always induce a match between the agent and the best alternative within his equilibrium 
choice set. By (3.4), ( , ) 0SsY d ω =  implies that ( , , ) 0.
D D
d dJ s Yω =  which means that d will not prefer 
( , )s ω  to his current option which is the best alternative within the choice set of demander d. 
Therefore ( , , )s d ω  cannot block the matching. Second, it is easy to see that no agent that is matched 
will block the matching induced by (3.3) and (3.4) since being matched under (3.3) and (3.4) will 
guarantee that the self-matched option is not preferred.    
                  Q.E.D. 
 
 Lemma 1 
 Let x be a non-negative real number, n be a non-negative integer and a and b positive real 
numbers such that b < a < 1.  Then 
   
1/log| || | .
log
a
x x a b aa b
a
−−
− ≤
−
 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Proof of (i): Then 
 
1
( )( ) ( ) .
x
x x x k k x
k
a b a b a b a b xa−
=
− = − < −∑   
For real x the function xxa  attains its maximum for 1 / logx a= −  which implies that
1/log / log .x axa a a c−≤ − ≡ Hence, we have proved the lemma. 
                      Q.E.D. 
 
 Lemma 2 
 Let , 1,2,..., ,jZ j n=  be independent binary random functions with realizations in {0,1}, and 
with .j jEZ p=  Then  
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           2
1
1
( ( ))
m
n m k k
j j kj
k
E Z p K n p
=
=
− <∑ ∑  
where 1 2, ,...,K K  are constants that do not depend on { }jp  and 
     
1
/ .
n
j
j
p p n
=
=∑  
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Let s be a real number and define 
  
1
( ) exp( ( )).n j jjs E s Z pψ == −∑   
We have that 
  
1
1
exp( ) (1 )
n
n s
j j jj
j
E s Z p p e
=
=
= − +∑ ∏   
from which it follows that  
  
1
( ) ( ).
n
j
j
s g sψ
=
=∏  
where 
  (1 )( ) (1 ) .j jsp s pj j jg s p e p e
− −= − +  
Note that 
  ( ) 1(0) ( ( )) .
nr r
j jj
E Z pψ
=
= −∑  
Let ( ) log ( ).j jf s g s=  Then we get that  
(A.1)  
1
( ) ( ) ( ).
n
j
j
s s f sψ ψ
=
′ ′= ∑  
From (A.1) we have that  
(A.2)  ( 1) ( ) ( 1 )
0 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
r n
r k r k
j
k j
r
s s f s
k
ψ ψ+ + −
= =
  
=   
  
∑ ∑  
for 1.r ≥  It follows readily that 
  ( ) 1 1(0) (1 )((1 ) ( ) )r r rj j j j jg p p p p
− −= − − − −  
which implies that 
(A.3)   ( ) (0) (1 ) .rj j j jg p p p≤ − ≤  
Furthermore  
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  ( 1) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1 )
0 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
r r
r k r k r k r k
j j j j j j j
k k
r r
g s g s f s f s g s g s f s
k k
+ + − + + −
= =
   
= = +   
   
∑ ∑  
which implies that  
(A.4)  ( 1) ( 1) ( 1 )
1
1| (0) | (0) | (0) |
4
r
r r r k
j j j
k
r
f g f
k
+ + + −
=
 
≤ +  
 
∑  
for 1.r ≥  We have that 
   (0) (0) 0,j jf g′ ′= =  (0) (0) .j j jf g p′′ ′′= ≤  
Now suppose there exist constants { }kb  such that 
( )| (0) |kj k jf b p≤  for k = 1, 2, …,r. This is true for r = 
1 and 2. Then it follows from (A.4) that 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1 )
1 1 1
1 1 1| (0) | (0) | (0) | (1 ) .
4 4 4
r r r
r r r k
j j j j k j k j
k k k
r r r
f g f p b p b p
k k k
+ + + −
= = =
     
≤ + ≤ + = +     
     
∑ ∑ ∑  
 Hence, with 
  1
1
11
4
r
r k
k
r
b b
k+ =
 
= +  
 
∑  
it follows that 
(A.5)   ( 1) 1| (0) |
r
j r jf b p
+
+≤   
Suppose next that the claim of the Lemma is true for a given m. We shall prove that it holds for 1.m +   
We know that it is true for m = 2 because in this case  
  21
1 1
( ( )) (1 ) .
n n
n
j j j j jj
j j
E Z p VarZ p p np
=
= =
− = = − ≤∑ ∑ ∑  
Since (0) 0jf ′ =  it follows from (A.2) and (A.5) that 
 
2 2
2( 1) ( ) (2 2 ) ( )
2 2
0 1 0 1
2 2
(0) (0) (0) (0)
m n m n
m k m k k
j m k j
k j k j
m m
f b p
k k
ψ ψ ψ+ + − + −
= = = =
   
= ≤   
   
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
2 2 2
( ) 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 /2 2
2 2 2
(0) ( ) ( ) .
m m m
k r r
m k r m k r m k
k k r k r m k r
m m m
b np K np b np K b
k k k
ψ + ++ − + − + −
= = ≤ ≤ ≥
      
= ≤ =       
      
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
The last expression above is a polynomial in np  of degree m +1. Hence, the lemma follows by 
recursion. 
                        Q.E.D. 
 
 Before we continue we need to introduce some additional notation. Let [x] denote the ceiling 
function, that is, the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to x. Let n∆  be the set of n-
dimensional vectors with components that are either zero or one and let C be a set with elements that 
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are non-negative variables. Define || ||C  as the sum of the variables in C divided by the square root of 
the number of variables in C.   
 
Lemma 3 
Let ( , ),sJ d y ,ny∈∆ 1,2,...,[ ],d nκ= 1,..., ,s n=  be binary random variables with realizations 
in {0,1} with ( , ) (|| ||),s nEJ d y p y=  where (|| ||) (|| ||)np y n h y<  for some function h for all n and 
,ny∈∆ (|| ||) 0h y →  as || ||y →∞  and κ is a positive constant. Moreover, the variables ( , )sJ d y and
( , )rJ d z  are independent when ( , ) ( , ).s z r y≠  Let ( (1), (2),..., ( )),y y y y n=

 for ( ) ny k ∈∆ and 
{ : ( ) , 1,2,.., }.n ny y k k n∆ = ∈∆ = 
 Then 
[ ] 1
1max max | ( ( , ( )) (|| ( ) ||) | 0 1.
n
n
s ny d n ns
P J d y s p y s
nκ∈∆ ≤ →∞=
 
− → = 
 
∑

 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Let 0,ε > 0 / 2,δ ε< < ˆ (|| ||) max( (|| ||), )n np y p y δ=  for ny∈∆  and let β  be defined such that 
(|| ||)nn p y δ≤  when || || .y β>  This is possible due to the assumptions. Let 
             
1
1( , ) ( ( , ( )) (|| ( ) ||))
n
n s n
s
Z d y J d y s p y s
n =
= −∑

  
and 
  
1
1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ( , ( )) (|| ( ) ||)).
n
n s n
s
Z d y J d y s p y s
n =
= −∑

 
Since (|| ( ) ||) (|| ( ) ||),np y k n h y k<  for ( ) ny k ∈∆  it follows from Lemma 2 that for some suitable 
constants h  and h∗  
(A.6)  
6 6
12 6 0.5 6
3
1 1
( , ) ( )r r r rn r n r
r r
hEZ d y K n p y n K h n
n
∗
− −
= =
< < <∑ ∑ 
 
  
where 
      1
1
( ) (|| ( ) ||).
n
n n
k
p y n p y k−
=
= ∑

  
Hence, for any 0,ε >  it then follows from (A.6) and Chebyshev’s inequality that 
(A.7)  ( )
12
12 3 12
( , )
| ( , ) | .nn
EX d y hP X d y
n
ε
ε ε
∗
> ≤ ≤

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Note furthermore that 1 (|| ( ||)np y k−  and (|| ( ) ||),np y k−  can each attain at most [ ]nβ  different 
values when || ( ) || .y k β≤  Hence, ˆ1 (|| ( ||)np y k−  and ˆ (|| ( ) ||)np y k−  can attain at most [ ] 1.nβ + This 
implies that ˆ| ( , ) |nX d y

 can attain at most 2 [ ] 2n n nβ +  different values. Note that 
                        2 [ ] 2 2 ( 1) 2 2 ( 2 / ) 2( 2) .n n n < n n n = n n n n nβ β β β+ + + + ≤ +   
Note also that if ,jB  j = 1, 2,…, are different events the following inequality holds 
(A.8)  ( ) | | max ( )j j j j
j Kj
P B P B K P B
∈
 
≤ ≤ 
 
∑   
where K is the index set that corresponds to different jB  and | |K  is the number of elements in K.  
Note that 
  
1
1 ˆ| ( (|| ( ) ||) (|| ( ) ||)) | .
n
n n
s
p y s p y s
n
δ
=
− ≤∑  
Since 
              
1
1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( (|| ( ) ||) (|| ( ) ||))
n
n n n n
s
Z d y Z d y p y s p y s
n =
= + −∑
 
 
it follows readily that  
(A.9)    ˆ ˆ| ( , ) | | ( , ) | | ( , ) | .n n nZ d y Z d y Z d yδ δ− ≤ ≤ +
  
 
Consequently, we obtain from (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9) that  
(A.10)      
[ ] [ ]
ˆmax max | ( , ) | max max | ( , ) |
n n
n ny d n y d n
P Z d y P Z d y
κ κ
ε ε δ
∈∆ ≤ ∈∆ ≤
   > ≤ > −   
      
  
              
, [ ]
ˆ(| ( , ) | )
n
n
y d n
P Z d y
κ
ε δ
∈∆ ≤
 
= > −  
  
  
         
[ ] [ ]
ˆ2( 2) max max (| ( , ) | ) 2( 2) max max (| ( , ) | 2 )
n n
n ny d n y d n
n n P Z d y n n P Z d y
κ κ
β ε δ β ε δ
∈∆ ≤ ∈∆ ≤
≤ + > − ≤ + > −
   
 
   12 3 12
2( 2) 2( 2) .
( 2 ) ( 2 )
h n n h
n n n
β β
ε δ ε δ
∗ ∗+ +
≤ =
− −
 
Let nA  be the event  
    
[ ]
{max max | ( , ) | }
n
n ny d n
A Z d y
κ
ε
∈∆ ≤
= >
 
 
and define 
    
1
.n
k n k
D A
∞ ∞
= =
=   
Recall that the series 1 / s
n
n∑  converges when 1.s >  From (A.10) it follows that  
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   12
1 1
2( 2) 1( ) .
( 2 )nn n
hP A
n n
β
ε δ
∗∞ ∞
= =
+
≤ < ∞
−∑ ∑   
From Borel-Cantelli’s Theorem it therefore follows that ( ) 0,P D =  which means that, with probability 
one, only finitely many nA can occur. Hence, the proof is complete. 
           Q.E.D.  
 Before we state the next result we need to introduce additional notation. Let 0 ( ),
rF u  r = S, D, 
be two c.d.f. defined on the positive part of the real line, r=S, D. Let ( , )Six j ω  and ( , )
D
jx i ω  be real 
numbers and define vectors 1 2( ) ( ( , ), ( , ),...),
S S S
i i ix j x j x jω ω= ( (1), (2),...),
S S S
i i ix x x= 1 2( , ,...),
S S Sx x x=  
and define  ( ),Djx i  
D
jx  and 
Dx  similarly. Let Q be the dimension of ( , ).S Dx x   
 
 Lemma 4 
 Let  
  0
0
( ) (1 / )uz rr u e F z dzψ
∞
−= ∫   
for r = S, D and 0.u ≥  Assume that (0) ,rψ < ∞ Let { ( , )}
S
ia j ω  and { ( , )}Dja i ω  be positive random 
functions such that ( , ) ,SiEa j ω < ∞ ( , )
D
jEa i ω < ∞ and { },
S
iλ { },
D
jλ { }ijπ  and κ be positive real 
numbers with 1,Siλ ≤ 1
D
jλ ≤  and 1.ijπ ≤   
numbers,  and let 
   ( , ) log[ { ( , ) ( ( , )exp( ( , )))} ],D D D D D Dij j ij j D j j jk v WK x E a i a k v x k vω π ω ψ λ κ∈= ∑ ∑    
  ( , ) log[ { ( , ) ( ( , )exp( ( , )))} ],S S S S S Sij i ij i S i i ik v WK x E a j a k v x k vω π ω ψ λ∈= ∑ ∑      
1 2( ) ( ( , ), ( , ),...),
D D D D D D
ij j ij j ij jK x K x K xω ω= 1 1 2 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),...),
D D D D D D
i i iK x K x K x=   
1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),...),
D D D D D DK x K x K x=  and define ( ),S Sij iK x ( )
S S
jK x  and ( )
S SK x  similarly. Finally, let  
( , ) ( ( ), ( )).S D D D S SK x x K x K x=  Then ( , )S DK x x  is a contraction mapping on 
( ) {( , ) : ( , ) , ( , ) }S D S Di jT x x x j x iβ ω β ω β= ≤ ≤  into ( )T β  where β is a real number. Furthermore, 
( , )S DK x x  has a unique fixed 
point in .QR   
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Proof of Lemma 4: 
For simplicity, we shall go through the proof only in the case with flexible contracts and only one type 
of supplier and demander. Let 
      1 0
0
( ) exp( / ) ( )rr u z u z dF zγ
∞
−= −∫ , 
for r = S, D,  
     ( , ) log { ( ) ( ( )exp( ( ))},S S S S SS v WK x E a a v x vω π ω ψ ∈= ∑            
     ( , ) log { ( ) ( ( )exp( ( )))},D D D D DD v WK x E a a v x vω πκ ω ψ ∈= ∑   
     ( ) { ( , )},D D D DK x K x ω= ( ) { ( , )}S S S SK x K x ω=  and ( , ) ( ( ), ( )).S D D D S SK x x K x K x=   
By applying integration by parts it follows that  
(A.11)    0 0
0 0
(1 exp( / ))( ) exp( ) (1 / ) ( )r rr
u zu uz F z dz dF z
u
ψ
∞ ∞ − −
= − = ⋅∫ ∫   
for r = S, D. From (A.11) we see that  
(A.12)  ( ) ( ) ( ).r r ru u u uγ ψ ψ ′= +  
Furthermore, (A.11) implies that 
(A.13)  1 0 0
0 0
(1 (1 / )exp( / ))( ) exp( / ) ( ) ( ) ( ).r rr r
u z u zu u z u z dF z u dF z
u
ψ ψ
∞ ∞
− − + −′ = − − = − ⋅∫ ∫  
Since 1 / exp( / )u z u z+ ≤  when / 0u z ≥  it follows that ( ) 0ru uψ ′− >  for positive u. Hence, (A.12) and 
(A.13) imply that 
(A.14)    0 { ( ) ( )exp( ( ))) ( ( )exp( ( )))})S S S S Srv W z WE a a v x v a v x vω ψ∈ ∈′< − ∑ ∑    
        { ( ) ( ( )exp( ( )))} { ( ) ( ( )exp( ( )))}.S S S S S Sr r iz W k z WE a a v x v E a a v x vω ψ ω γ∈ ∈= −∑ ∑ ∑     
From (A.14) we obtain that 
(A.15a)     ( , )| |
( )
S
S
S
W
K x
xω
ω
ω′∈
∂
′∂∑  
  
{ ( ) ( )exp( ( ))) ( ( )exp( ( )))})
1 ( ) 0
{ ( ) ( ( )exp( ( ))})
S S S S S
S Sv W v W
S S S
S v W
E a a v x v a v x v
G x
E a a v x v
ω ψ
ω ψ
∈ ∈
∈
′−
= = − ≥∑ ∑
∑
  
 
 
where 
  
{ ( ) ( ( )exp( ( )))}
( ) .
{ ( ) ( ( )exp( ( )))}
S S S
rS v W
S S S
S v W
E a a v x v
G x
E a a v x v
ω γ
ω ψ
∈
∈
= ∑
∑
 
 
 
Since  
  { ( ) ( ( )exp( ( )))} { ( ) (0)}S S S SS Sv WE a a v x v E aω ψ ω ψ∈ ≤ < ∞∑    
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it follows that 0 ( )SG x<  and therefore  1 ( ) 1SG x− <  when ( )Sx ω β≤  for .Wω∈  Similarly, it 
follows that  
(A.15b)  ( , )| | 1.
( )
D D
W D
K y
yω
ω
ω′∈
∂
<
′∂∑  
Let x  and x be two points in ( ).T β  By the mean value theorem we have that 
(A.16a)    
ˆ( , )( , ) ( , ) ( ( ) ( ))
( )
S S
S S S S S S
S
v W
K xK x K x x v x v
x v
ω
ω ω
∈
∂
− = −
∂∑     
and 
(A.16b)  ˆ( , )( , ) ( , ) ( ( ) ( ))
( )
D D
D D D D D D
D
v W
K xK x K x x v x v
x v
ω
ω ω
∈
∂
− = −
∂∑   
where ˆSx  and ˆDx  are suitable vectors. Let 1 2( , ,...)w w w ′=  be a vector and define the metric ||| |||⋅  by 
||| ||| max | | .k kw w=  By using (A.15a,b) we realize that (A.16a,b) imply that we can find a positive 
constant 1D <  such that 
(A.17)            ||| ( , ) ( , ) ||| ||| ( , ) ( , ) ||| .S D S D S D S DK x x K x x D x x x x− ≤ −     
because ( )Saπ ω < ( ))S
v W
a v
∈∑   almost surely. Therefore, ( , )S DK x x  is a contraction mapping on .QR   
 We shall next show that ( , ) ( )S DK x x T β∈ whenever ( , ) ( ).S Dx x T β∈  Using (A.11) we obtain 
that 
(A.18)     1( ) .S u u
ψ <  
Hence, (A.18) implies that 
            (0, ) log { ( ) ( ( ))} log { ( ) ( ( ))}S S S S SS Sv W v WK E a a v E a a vω π ω ψ π ω ψ∈ ∈= =∑ ∑     
             ( )log 0
( ))
S
S
v W
aE
a v
π ω
∈
  < < 
  ∑


 
because ( )Saπ ω < ( ))S
v W
a v
∈∑   almost surely. Similarly, it follows that (0, ) 0.DK ω <  From (A.17) 
we thus obtain that 
  ||| ( , ) (0,0) ||| ||| ( , ) |||S D S DK x x K D x x− ≤  
which yields 
  ( , ) (0, ) ||| ||| ||| |||r r r r rK x K x xω ω≤ + <  
for , .r S D=  Hence, ( , ) ( )S DK x x T β∈  whenever ( , ) ( )S Dx x T β∈  for any positive .β  Therefore, 
( , )S DK x x  is a contraction mapping on ( ).T β  From Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell, 1965) it then 
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follows that the equation ( , )S DK x x  has a unique fixed point in ( ).T β  But since β  is an arbitrary 
positive number it implies that ( , )S DK x x  also has only one fixed point of ( , )S DK x x in QR  where Q is 
the dimension of ( , ).S Dx x  To realize this, suppose that there is another (finite) fixed point ( , )S Dx x  of 
( , )S DK x x  in QR  that does not belong to ( ).T β  Then, there exists another β β∗ >  such that 
( , ) ( ).S Dx x T β ∗∈  But this leads to a contradiction because we proved above that ( , )S DK x x  has only 
a unique fixed point in ( ).T β ∗  Hence, the proof is complete. 
          Q.E.D. 
 Lemma 5 
 Assume that the sequence of functions ( )nh x  converges uniformly to ( )h x  on a set A. If  
( )f x c>  for some positive constant c then log ( )nh x  converges uniformly to log ( )h x  on A. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
Note first that log(1 )x x+ ≤ for all positive x and log(1 / 2)x x− ≥ −  for 1 0.x> ≥  To realize this 
consider the function log(1 ).x x− +  This function has derivative 1 1 / (1 ) 0.x− + ≥ is increasing for 
positive x, which implies that log(1 ) 0.x x− + ≥  Similarly, it follows that log(1 / 2)x x− +  is 
decreasing in x so that log(1 / 2) log0.5 1 0.31.x x− + > + ≅  Let 0.ε >  By assumption  
         0.5 ( ) ( )nc h x h x cε ε− < − <  
provided n is sufficiently large. Accordingly,  
  log ( ) log ( ) log(1 / ( )) log ( ) log(1 )nh x h x c h x h xε ε ε< + + ≤ + + ≤  
and  
  ω  log ( ) log ( ) log(1 0.5 / ( )) log ( ) log(1 / 2) .nh x h x c h x h xε ε ε> + − ≥ + − ≥ −  
Hence, it follows that | log ( ) log ( ) | .nh x h x ε− ≤  
            Q.E.D. 
 In the following lemma (Lemma 6) we prove an important result in the general case where the 
systematic terms are ( , ; ( , ), ( , ))S Si sd sia j i j z jω η ω  and ( , ; ( , ), ( , )).
D D
j sd dja i i j z iω η ω  That is, in addition to 
depending on the latent matching variable ( , )sd i jη  (match quality) also depend on a random effects 
that account for unobservable attributes of potential partners. Here, we assume that ( , )sd i jη  has finite 
support located at the points { (1), (2),...}.η η  Let ( , , ) ( , ; ( ), ( , ))S S Si i sia j k a j k z jω ω η ω=  and 
( , , ) ( , ; ( ), ( , )).D D Dj j dja i k a i k z iω ω η ω=  Moreover, let ( , , , ) 1
D
djy s i qω =  if demander d of type j belongs to 
56 
the choice set of supplier s of type i at contract ω  and match quality ( ),qη  and zero otherwise. Let 
( , , ) { ( , , , ), }D D Sdj dj iy i q y s j q sω ω= ∈Ω  and define ( , , , )
S
siy d j qω  and ( , , )
S
siy j qω  similarly.  
 
 Lemma 6 
 Assume that Assumptions 1,3,5 and 7 hold and that the matching random effect ( , )sd i jη  has 
finite support. Then 
         (( ( , , , ) | ( , ) ( ))S Ssi si sdN E J d j y i j qω η η=         
converges uniformly to  
   0
( , , ) ( , , )0
{ ( , , ) exp( ( , ; ) || ( , , ) || ( , , ) || ( , , ) ||) (1 / ) }S S S S S Si i si i si
k v r j q
E a j q z a k v r y k v r za j q y j q F z dz
ω
ω ω ω
∞
≠
− −∑∫      
and   
       (( ( , , , ) | ( , ) ( ))D Ddj dj sdN E J s i y i j qω η η=  
converges uniformly to 
    0
( , , ) ( , , )0
{ ( , , ) exp( ( , , ) || ( , , ) || ( , , ) || ( , , )) ||) (1 / ) ,D D D D D Dj j dj j dj
k v r i q
E a i q z a k v r y k v r za i q y i q F z dz
ω
ω ω ω
∞
≠
− −∑∫    
 as .N →∞  
 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
For simplicity, we only present the proof for the case with one observable type of suppliers and 
demanders and no flexible contract. The proof in the general case is entirely analogous. Assume first 
that some of the components of ( )Dy s  are positive. For simplicity and with no real loss of generality 
suppose the support of the distribution of sdη  is given by the set { (1), (2), (3)}.η η η  For simplicity, let 
1( ) ( ( ) / ( ))
S S
qNH v = F vb N a q  and ( ) exp( ( ) / ), 1,2,3.
S
qG v a q v q= − =  We have that 
 (A.19)      ( ( , ) | ( ))S Ss s sdN E J d y qη η=  
         || ( )|| ( , ) || ( )|| 0
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S S
s sy q N s q y r N S
qN qN rN
r q
N E dH v H v H v F v dvδ
∞
−
≠
 
=  
 
∏∫      
 ( )[|| ( , )|| 1 ( , ) || ( , )|| 0
0
( ) ( ) ( )
[|| ( , ) || 1 ( , )]
D Dy s q N s q y s r N S
rN rND
r j
N E d H v H v F v dv
y s q N s q
δ
δ
∞
+ −
≠
 
=  
+ −  
∏∫  
where ( , ) 1s qδ = if demander d is in the choice set of supplier s given that ( ).sd qη η=  We have that 
(A.20)    ( )|| 1)|| || (2)|| || (3)|| [|| (1)||] [|| (2)||] [|| (3)||]1 2 3 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( )S S Sy N y N y N S S Ss s s s s sy y yN N Nd H v H v H v d G v G v G v  −     
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    ( )|| (1)|| || (2)|| [|| (3)|| ][|| (1)||]1 1 2 3( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )S S Sy N S y N y Ns s ssyN N Nd H v d G v H v H v = −     
 ( )|| (2)|| [|| (2)||] || (3)||[|| (1)||]2 2 1 3( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )S S Sy N y S y Ns s ssyN NH v G v d G v H v+ −  
 ( )|| (3)|| [|| (3)||] [|| (1)||] [|| (2)||]3 3 1 2( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) .Sy N S S Ss s s sy y yNH v G v d G v G v+ −  
As a consequence we obtain that 
(A.21) ( )|| ( )|| || ( )|| [|| ( )||] [|| ( )||] 0
0
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( )
S S S S
s s s sy j N y r N y j y r S
rN rN j r
r j r j
E d H v H v dG v G v F v
∞
≠ ≠
 
− 
 
∏ ∏∫  
 ( ) ( )|| (1)|| [|| (1)||] || (2)|| || (3)||1 1 2 3 0
0
( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Sy N S S Ss
s s sy y N y N S
N N NE d H v d G v H v H v F v
∞ 
= − 
 
∫   
 ( )|| (2)|| [|| (2)||] [|| (1)||] || (3)||2 2 1 3 0
0
( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S S S S
s s s sy y y y S
N NE H v G v d G v H v F v
∞ 
+ − 
 
∫   
 ( )|| (3)|| [|| (3)||] [|| (1)||] [|| (2)||]3 3 1 2 0
0
( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
S S S S
s s s sy N y y y S
NE H v G v d G v G v F v
∞ 
+ − 
 
∫   
Consider the integral 
 ( ) ( )|| (1)|| [|| (1)||] || (2)|| || (3)||1 1 2 3 0
0
( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
S S S S
s s s sy N y y N y N S
N N NE d H v d G v H v H v F v
∞ 
− 
 
∫  
From Lemma 1we obtain that 
(A.22)     || ( )|| [|| ( )||] [ ]| ( ) ( ) | | ( ) ( ) |
S S
s sy q N y j N
qN q qN qH v G v c H v G v− ≤ −  
where c is a suitable constant. From (A.22), the mean value theorem for integrals, and subsequent 
integration by parts we get, for some x, that 
(A.23) ( ) ( )|| (1)|| [|| (1)||] || (2)|| || (3)||1 1 2 3 0
0
| ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) |
S S S S
s s s sy N y y N y N S
N N NE d H v d G v H v H v F v
∞ 
− 
 
∫  
 ( ) ( )|| (2)|| || (3)|| || (1)|| [|| (1)||]2 3 1 1 0
0
| ( ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( )) |
S S S S
s s s sy N y N y N y S
N N NE H x H x d H v d G v F v
∞
= −∫   
 || (2)|| || (3)|| [|| (1)||] || (1)||2 3 1 1 0
0
| ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) |
S S S S
s s s sy N y N y y N S
N N NE H x H x G v H v dF v
∞
= −∫   
 
[ ][|| (1)||] || (1)||
1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0
( | ( ) ( ) | ( )) ( | ( ) ( ) | ( )).
S S N
s sy y N S S
N NE G v H v dF v cE G v H v dF v
∞ ∞
≤ − ≤ −∫ ∫  
By Proposition 1.11 in Resnick (1987) it follows that 
[ ]
1 1( ) ( ) 0
N
NH v G v− →  as .N →∞  Hence, 
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem implies that  
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[ ]
1 1 0
0
( | ( ) ( ) | ( )) 0
N S
NE G v H v dF v
∞
− →∫  
as N →∞  which shows that the first integral on the right hand side of (A.21) converges to zero as 
.N →∞  Similarly 
 || (2)|| [|| (2)||] [|| (1)||] || (3)||2 2 1 3 0
0
| ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) |
S S S S
s s s sy N y y y N S
N NE H v G v d G v H v F v
∞
−∫  
    || (2)|| [|| (2)||] [|| (1)||] 12 2 1 1
0
[|| (1) ||] ( | ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( ))
S S S
s s sy N y yS
s Ny E H v G v G v dG v
∞
−≤ −∫  
 
[ ] [|| (1)||] 1
2 2 1 1
0
[|| (1) ||] ( | ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( ))
SN
syS
s Nc y E H v G v G v dG v
∞
−≤ −∫  
       
[ ] [ ][|| (1)||] 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 1
0 0
( | ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( )) ( | ( ) ( ) | ( ))
SN N
sy
N Nc E H v G v G v dG v c E H v G v dG vβ β
∞ ∞
−≤ − ≤ −∫ ∫  
which shows that also the second integral on the right hand side of (A.21) converges to zero as 
N →∞  due to Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem. Similarly, it follows that the third 
integral on the right hand side of (A.21) converges towards zero when .N →∞  Accordingly, it 
follows from (A.19) that, as ,N →∞  
 ( ( , ) | ( ))S Ss s sdN E J d y jη η= →
[|| ( )||] [|| ( )||]
0
0
( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
S S
s sy j y r S
j r
r j
E d G v G v F v dv
∞
≠
 
 
 
∏∫  
which proves the first part of the lemma. The proof of the second part of the lemma is analogous. 
                Q.E.D. 
 
Before we turn to the next result we need some additional notation. Let 
( , ) ( , ; ( , ), ( , , ))S S Si i si sda j a j z j i jω ω ω η ω=  and ( , ) ( , ; ( , ), ( , , ))
D D D
j j dj sda i a i z i i jω ω ω η ω=  where 
{ ( , ), ( , ), ( , , )}S Dsi dj sdz j z i i jω ω η ω  are independent random effects and ( , , ) ( , , )sd dsi j j iη ω η ω= . 
 
 Lemma 7 
Assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 hold. Let 
0
0
( ) exp( ) (1 / ) ,rr x xv F v dvψ
∞
= −∫  
for , .r S D=  Then 
           lim || ( , , ) || ( , ),D Sj iN Y s i m jω ω→∞ =   lim || ( , , ) || ( , )
S D
i jN
Y d j m iω ω
→∞
=   
where { ( , )}Sim j ω  and { ( , )}
D
jm i ω  are uniquely determined by the equations 
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                ( , ) { ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ))}S D D D Di j D j j jk z Wm j E a i a k z m k zω ω ψ λ κ∈= ∑ ∑    
and 
              ( , ) { ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ))}D S S S Sj i S i i ik z Wm i E a j a k z m k zω ω ψ λ∈= ∑ ∑    
 for all i  and j and .Wω∈  
  
 
Proof of Lemma 7: 
We shall only give the proof for the special case with no flexible contracts and one type of suppliers 
and one type of demanders. Let∆ be the set of vectors with components that are either zero or one. As 
previously, let ( ) 1Ssy d =  if demander d is in the choice set of supplier s and zero otherwise. Similarly,
( ) 1Ddy s = if supplier s is in the choice set of demander d and zero otherwise. Let { ( ), }
S S D
s sy y d d= ∈Ω  
and { ( ), }.D D Sd dy y s s= ∈Ω  Thus, exogenous choice sets of supplier s can be represented by 
S
sy  and 
similarly the exogenous choice set of demander d can be represented by .Ddy  Let 
S
sY  and 
D
dY denote 
the corresponding equilibrium values.  
Let { , }S S Ssy y s= ∈Ω

 { , }D D Ddy y d= ∈Ω

 and similar definition for the corresponding equilibrium 
variables (capital Y’s), Sh  and Dh  be functions defined by  
           
1
1( , ) ( , )
N
S D S S
s s
s
h d y J d y
N =
= ∑

  and  
1
1( , ) ( , ).
M
D D D D
d d
d
h s y J s y
N =
= ∑

 
Recall that || ||DdY N  is the number of suppliers in the equilibrium choice set of demander d and 
|| ||SsY N  is the number of demanders in the equilibrium choice set of supplier s. By (4.1) and (4.2) it 
follows that 
(A.24)      || || ( , )D S SdY h d Y= 
     and    || || ( , ).S D DsY h s Y= 
 
Then Lemma 3 implies that for any 0δ >  the following inequalities 
(A.25)           | ( , ) ( , ) |S S S Sh d y Eh d y δ− <
 
    and     | ( , ) ( , ) |D D D Dh s y Eh s y δ− <
 
 
hold for any d and ,S Dy y∈∆ ∈∆
 
 with probability 1 provided N is sufficiently large. Let 
(A.26)  0
0
( ) ( exp( ) (1 / ) )S S S Sf x E a a zx F z dzπ
∞
= −∫    and  0
0
( ) ( exp( ) (1 / ) )D D D Df x E a a zx F z dzπ
∞
= −∫   
for 0.x ≥ From Lemma 6 it follows that for any d and ,S Dy y∈∆ ∈∆
 
 that 
(A.27)      | ( , ) (|| ||) |S S S Ss s sN EJ d y f y δ− <    and   | ( , ) (|| ||) |
S D D D
d d dN EJ s y f y δ− <   
with probability 1 provided N is sufficiently large. Let Sm and Dm be determined by the equations 
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(A.28)    ( )S D Dm f mκ=   and   ( ).D S Sm f m=   
From Lemma 4 we have that the equations above have a unique positive solution for Sm  and .Dm  It 
now follows from (A.26), for , ,S Dy y∈∆ ∈∆
 
that 
(A.29a)       1 1| ( , ) (|| ||) | | [ ( , ) (|| ||)] |S S S S S S S Ss s s ss
s
Eh d y N f y N EJ d y f y
N
−− ≤ −∑ ∑

       
                   1 | ( , ) (|| ||) |S S S Ss s s
s
N EJ d y f y
N
δ≤ − <∑  
and similarly that  
(A.29b)  1 1| ( , ) (|| ||) |D D D DddEh s y N f yκ δ
− −− <∑

 
with probability 1, provided N is sufficiently large. Thus, from (A.24), (A.25) and (A.29a, b) we 
obtain that 
(A.30a)  1| ( , ) (|| ||) | | ( , ) ( , ) |S S S S S S S Sssh d y N f y h d y Eh d y
−− ≤ −∑
  
 
          1| ( , ) (|| ||) |S S S SssEh d y N f y
−+ − ∑

< 2δ   
with probability 1 and similarly that  
(A.30b)  1| ( , ) (|| ||) | 2D D D Dddh s y N f y δ
−− <∑

 
with probability 1 if N is sufficiently large. Let β be such that max( , ),S Dm mβ > ( )Sf β δ≤  and 
( ) .Df β δ≤  This is possible since ( ),rf x  r = S, D, are decreasing towards zero. Hence, we obtain that  
  1 1| ( (min(|| ||, )) (|| ||)) | | (min(|| ||, )) (|| ||) | .S S S S S S S Ss s s ss sN f y f y N f y f yβ β δ
− −− ≤ − <∑ ∑  
Consequently, it follows that  
(A.31a)        1 1| ( , ) (min(|| ||, )) | | ( , ) (|| ||) |S S S S S S S Ss ss sh d y N f y h d y N f yβ
− −− ≤ −∑ ∑
 
 
        1 | ( (min(|| ||, ) (|| ||)) | 3 .S S S Ss ssN f y f yβ δ
−+ − <∑  
Similarly, it follows that  
(A.31b)   1| ( , ) (min(|| ||, )) | 3 .D D D Dddh s y N f yκ β δ
−− ≤∑

 
Note that  
  (min(|| ||, )) ( ) 0S S Ssf y fβ β≥ >    and (min(|| ||, )) ( ) 0
D D D
df y fβ β≥ >  
Hence, Lemma 5 applies and (A.31a,b) imply that 
(A.32a)    ( )1| log ( , ) log (min(|| ||, )) | 2S S S Sssh d y N f y β δ−− <∑
  
and  
(A.32b)     ( )1| log ( , ) log (min(|| ||, )) | 2D D D Dddh s y N f y β δ−− <∑
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with probability 1 if N is sufficiently large. By Lemma 4 log ( )S zf e  and log ( )D zf e  are contraction 
mappings on the set ( ) { : },T z zβ β= ≤  that is 
(A.33)  | log ( ) log ( ) | | log log |S Sf x f z c x z− ≤ −     and    | log ( ) log ( ) | | log log |D Df x f z c x z− ≤ −  
for some positive 1c <  provided x and z belongs to ( ).T β   
 We are now ready to complete the proof. From (A.33) it follows that 
(A.34a)  ( )1| log (min(|| ||, )) log ( ) |S S S SssN f Y f mβ− −∑  
  ( )max | log (min(|| ||, )) log ( ) |S S S Sss f Y f mβ≤ −  
  max | logmin(|| ||, ) log |S Ss sc Y mβ≤ −  
and similarly 
(A.34b) ( )1| log (min(|| ||, )) log( ( )) |D D D DddN f Y f mβ κ− −∑  
   max | logmin(|| ||, ) log | .D Dd dc Y mβ≤ −  
Note furthermore that since max( , )S Dm mβ >  we have that  
(A.35a)  | log || || log | | logmin(|| ||, ) log |D D D Dd dY m Y mβ− ≥ −  
and 
(A.35b) | log || || log | | log(min || ||, ) log | .S S S Ss sY m Y mβ− ≥ −  
Finally, from (A.28), (A.30a,b), (A.34a,b) and (35a,b) we obtain that with probability 1 
 (A.36a)        max | log || || log | max | log ( , ) log ( ) |D D S S S Sd d dY m h d Y f m− = −
  
     ( )1max | log ( , ) log (min(|| ||, )) |S S S Sd ssh d Y N f Y β−≤ − ∑  
  ( )1| log (min(|| ||), )) log ( ) |S S S SssN f Y f mβ−+ −∑  
  3 max | logmin(|| ||, ) log | 3 max | log || || log |S S S Ss s s sc Y m c Y mδ β δ≤ + − ≤ + −   
and 
(A.36b) max | log || || log | 3 max | log || || log |S S D Ds s d dY m c Y mδ− ≤ + −  
if N is sufficiently large. When combining (A.36a) and (A.36b) we obtain that 
 2max | log || || log | 3 3 max | log || || log |D D D Dd d d dY m c+ c Y mδ δ− ≤ + −  
which implies that 
(A.37a)   
2
3 (1 ) 3max | log || || log |
1 1
D D
d d
cY m
c c
δ δ+
− ≤ =
− −
 
with probability 1 if N is large enough. In the same way it follows that also  
(A.37b)   3max | log || || log |
1
S S
s sY m c
δ
− ≤
−
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with probability 1 if N is large enough. Hence, with probability 1 the sizes of the choice sets 
normalized by b tend towards the deterministic terms Dm  and Sm which are determined by (A.28). 
 Similarly, in the general case with several observable groups of suppliers and demanders and 
flexible contracts we get that || ( , ) ||SsiY j ω  converges towards ( , )
S
im j ω  with probability one and 
( , ) ||Ddj||Y j ω  converges towards ( , )Djm i ω  with probability one. Hence, Lemma 7 follows where 
{ ( , )}Djm i ω  and { ( , )}
S
im j ω  are determined by the equations 
  0
0
( , ) { ( , ) exp( ( , ) ( , )) (1 / ) )}D S S S S Sj ij i i i i
k v W
m i E a j z a k v m k v F z dzω π ω λ
∞
∈
= − ∑∑∫  
  0
0
( , ) { ( , ) exp( ( , ) ( , )) (1 / ) }.S D D D D Si ij j j j j
k v W
m j E a i z a k v m k v F z dzκ ω π ω λ
∞
∈
= − ∑∑∫  
By Lemma 5 the system of equations above have a unique solution. Thus, the proof of Lemma 7 is 
complete. 
            Q.E.D. 
 
 Lemma 8 
 Under the assumptions of Lemma 7 it follows that 
   lim ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )S S S Dij i i i jN X j m j m iω λ ϕ ω ω ω→∞ = =  
with probability 1, where the asymptotic choice probabilities of being self-matched are given by  
              (0) 1 ( , ) ( , ) / ,S S D Si i k ik z W m k z m i zϕ λ∈= −∑ ∑   
             (0) 1 ( , ) ( , ) /D D S Sj j k jk z W m k z m j zϕ λ κ∈= −∑ ∑   
for all i  and j and .Wω∈  
 
Proof of Lemma 8: 
Consider next the asymptotic behavior of X. Let (|| ||) ( , ).S S SN s s sp y EJ d y=  Due to the result we just 
proved above it follows that there exists a positive β  such that || ||SsY β<  and || ||
D
dY β<  with 
probability 1. We have that 
(A.38)       1| | | ( ) ( ) |D S S D D Ss d
d s
X m m Y d Y s m m
N
− = −∑∑  
  1| ( ( , ) (|| ||)) ( ) |S S S Ds s N s d
d s
J d Y p Y Y s
N
≤ −∑∑  
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        1 | ( (|| ||) (|| ||)) ( ) |S S S DN s s d
s
N p Y f Y Y s
N N
+ −∑  
           1 | ( (|| ||) ) ( ) | ||| || ) |
D
S S D D S S
s d s
s s
mf Y m Y s Y m
NN N
+ − + −∑ ∑ . 
Let ( )d s∗  denote the chosen demander by supplier s in equilibrium. Then  
1 ( ( , ) (|| ||)) ( ) ( ( ( ), ) (|| ||))S S S D S S Ss s N s d s s N s
d s s
J d Y p Y Y s J d s Y p Y
N
∗− = −∑∑ ∑  
because when the matching is stable ( ) 1DdY s =  when ( ),d d s
∗=  and ( ) 0DdY s = otherwise.  Hence, 
when N is large it follows from Lemma 3 that for any 0δ >   
     1| ( ( , ) (|| ||)) ( ) | | ( ( ( ), ) (|| ||)) |S S S D S S Ss s N s d s s N s
d s s
J d Y p Y Y s J d s Y p Y
N
∗− = −∑∑ ∑  
[ ]
1 1max | ( ( ( ) ) (|| ||)) | max max | ( ( ) (|| ||)) | .
S S
N N
S S S S S S
s s N s s s N sd Ny ys s
J d s , y p y J d , y p y
N N κ
δ∗
≤∈∆ ∈∆
≤ − ≤ − ≤∑ ∑
  
 
Moreover, Lemma 6 implies that with probability 1 
       | (|| ||) (|| ||) |S S SN s sN p Y f Y δ− <  
if N is sufficiently large. Above we proved that ||| || |S SsY m δ− <  with probability 1 if N is sufficiently 
large. Due to the fact that ( )Sf x  is continuous it follows from Slutsky’s Theorem that 
(A.39)  (|| ||) | (|| ||) ( ) |S S D S S S Ss s| f Y m | f Y f m δ− = − <  
with probability 1 if N is sufficiently large. Therefore, it follows from (A.38) to A.39) that 
  | | 2 || || / (1 2 )D S S D Ds
s
X m m Y N + m mδ δ δ δ β− < + ≤ + +∑  
with probability 1 if N is sufficiently large. Hence, X converges with probability 1 towards D Sm m  as 
.N →∞   
             Q.E.D. 
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Appendix B 
The case with interdependent preferences 
 Lemma 9 
 Assumption 8 implies that the joint distributions of the error terms of the suppliers and the 
demanders have the structure 
(B.1)           1/( ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )) exp ( , , )
DD
jj
S
Sij si si si
j dd
P z d j x d j x d j
θ
θω ε ω ω ω −
∈Ω∈Ω
        ≤ = −         
∑ ∑  
and 
(B.2)         1/( ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )) exp ( , , ) ,
SS
ii
D
Sji dj dj dj
i ss
P z s i x s i x s i
θ
θω ε ω ω ω −
∈Ω∈Ω
        ≤ = −         
∑ ∑   
where (0,1].θ ∈  The parameter θ  has the interpretation  
(B.3) ( ) ( ) 2log ( , , ), log ( , , ) log ( , , ), log ( , , ) 1S S D Dsi si dj djCorr U d j U r k Corr U s i U k rω ω ω ω θ= = −  
for , Djd r∈Ω  and , .
S
is k∈Ω  Otherwise ( , , )
S
si d jε ω  and ( , , )
S
si r kε ω′  are independent if 
( , , ) ( , , )d j r kω ω′≠  and ( , , )Ddj s iε ω  is independent of ( , , )
D
dj k rε ω′  if ( , , ) ( , , ).s i r kω ω′≠  
 
Proof of Lemma 9: 
By Assumption 8 it follows by using the properties of the Stable distributions (1,1,0)Sθ  and (1,1,0)Sθ  
(see Samorodnitsky and Taqqu, 1994) that 
 1( ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )) exp ( , , )
DD
jj
S
Sij si s Sij si
j dd
P z d j x d j E z x d jω ε ω ω ω −
∈Ω∈Ω
   
   ≤ = −
  
  
∑ ∑  
 1/exp ( , , )
D
j
si
j d
x d j
θ
θω −
∈Ω
    = −     
∑ ∑  
and 
 1( ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )) exp ( , , )
SS
ii
D
Sji dj dj Dji dj
i ss
P z s i x s i E z x s iω ε ω ω ω −
∈Ω∈Ω
   
   ≤ = −
  
  
∑ ∑   
         1/exp ( , , )
S
i
dj
i s
x s i
θ
θω −
∈Ω
    = −     
∑ ∑ . 
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From Tiago de Oliveira (1973) follows. Hence, the proof is complete. 
              Q.E.D. 
 
             Lemma 10 
Assume that     
( , ) ( , ) ( , ),S S Si i ia j a j z jω ω ω=%  ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
D D D
j j ja i a i z iω ω ω=%  
0 ( ) ( (0) (0) )
S S SF z P z zε= ≤  and 0 ( ) ( (0) (0) )
D D DF z P z zε= ≤  
where ( , ),Sia j ω ( , )
D
ja i ω  are positive constants, { (0), (0)}
S Dε ε  are independent positive random 
variable with c.d.f. exp( 1 / ), 0,x x− >  and { ( , ), ( , ), (0), (0)}S D S Di jz j z i z zω ω  are independent and 
identically distributed random variables that are generated by a stable distribution9 that is totally 
skew to the right and with index ,θ 1.θ ≤ 10 Then the conclusion of Lemma 4 holds. 
 
Proof of Lemma 10: 
For simplicity we shall only go through the proof for the case with only one type of demanders and 
suppliers. From Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994) it follows that 
 exp( ( ( ) ( ) ( ) (0)))} exp( ( ( ) ( ) 1)}S S S S
v W v W
E u a v z v y v z cu a v y vθ θ θ
∈ ∈
− + = − +∑ ∑  
for real ( ) 0,y v ≥ .v W∈  By differentiating the above equation with respect to ( )uy ω  we obtain that 
   { ( ) ( )exp( ( ( ) ( ) ( ))) (0)))}S S S S S
v W
E a z u a v z v y v zω ω
∈
− +∑  
 1 1( ) ( ) exp( ( ( ) ( ) 1)}.S S
v W
c a u y v cu a v y vθ θ θ θ θ θθ ω − −
∈
= − +∑  
By using the same notation as in Lemma 4 the result above implies that 
 { ( ) ( ( )exp( ( ))}S S SS v WE a a v x vω ψ ∈∑   
 
0
{ ( ) ( ) exp( ( ( ) ( )exp( ( )) (0)))}S S S S S
v W
E a z u a v z v x z duω ω ν
∞
∈
= − +∑∫  
 1
0
( ) exp(( 1) ( )) exp( ( ( ) exp( ( )) 1)}S S
v W
c a x u cu a v x v duθ θ θ θθ ω θ ω θ
∞
−
∈
= − − +∑∫  
 ( ) exp(( 1) ( )) .
( ) exp( ( )) 1
S
S
v W
a x
a v x v
θ
θ
ω θ ω
θ
∈
−
=
+∑
  
Hence, it follows that 
                                                     
9 Recall that the stable distribution follows from an extended version of the Central limit theorem. See Samorodnitsky and 
Taqqu (1994) for a description of stable distribution. 
10 The case where 1θ = corresponds to a degenerate stable distribution with all mass located at zero. 
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 ( , )SK x ω =  ( )log( ( ) ) ( 1) ( ) log ( ) exp( ( )) 1S Sv Wa x a v x vθ θπ ω θ ω θ∈+ − − +∑   
which implies that 
 ( , )| | 1 1 1.
( ) ( ) exp( ( )) 1 ( ) exp( ) 1S Sv W v W v W
K x
x v a v x v a vθ θ
ω θ θ
θ θβ∈ ∈ ∈
∂
= − ≤ − <
∂ + +∑ ∑ ∑
  
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4. 
          Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 5: 
Due to Lemma 10 it follows, as in Lemma 7, that the sizes of the equilibrium choice sets, divided by 
,N  converge with probability one toward the corresponding unique asymptotic values as .N →∞  . 
Furthermore, it follows that ( )ijX ω  converges with probability one towards ( , ).
S S
i i jλ ϕ ω   
              Similarly to Dagsvik (2000, pp. 40-41) one can apply McFadden’s formula for Generalized 
Extreme Value random utility models (McFadden, 1984), which by (B.1) and (B.2) imply, 
asymptotically, that  
(B.4)   ( , ) ( ( , , ) max(max max max ( , , ) ( , , ), (0)))S D D D Si ij j dj dj dj djv W k rm j M P U s i U r k v Y r k v Uω π ω ∈= ≥   
 
1( , )( ( , ))
.
D D
j ij j i j
D
j
M a i N m i
R
θπ ω ω −
=  
where 
(B.5)  ( , )( ( , )) .D D Dj j j i j
k z W
R b a k z N m k z θ
∈
= +∑∑ . 
 Similarly, it follows that  
(B.6)  
1( , )( ( , ))
( , ) ,
S S
i ij i j iD
j S
i
N a j M m j
m i N
R
θπ ω ω
ω
−
=  
where 
(B.7)   ( , )( ( , )) .S S Si i i j i
k z W
R b a k z M m k z
θ
∈
= +∑∑  
It is, however, not evident how the constant b should depend on N. From (B.4) and (B.6) we obtain 
that 
(B.8)          
( 1)/ (2 )1/ (2 )
( , ) ( , )
( , )
S D
ij i i j jD
j i S D
i j
a j N a i M
m i N
R R
θ θ θθ θθπ ω ω
ω
− −−
  
=      
   
 
and 
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(B.9)      
1/ (2 ) ( 1)/ (2 )( , ) ( , )( , ) .
D S
ij j jS i i
i D S
j i
a i M a j Nm j N
R R
θ θ θ θ θθπ ω ω
ω
− − −   
=        
 
Moreover, after some straight forward calculus, one obtains that 
(B.10)  
1/2
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ,
S D
ij i i j jS D
i i j j S D
i j
a j N a i M
N j M i
R R
θθπ ω ω
ϕ ω ϕ ω
−
 
= = ⋅  
 
  
(B.11)   (0)Si S
i
b
R
ϕ =  and  (0)Dj D
j
b
R
ϕ = . 
By inserting the equations in (B.11) into (B.10) we obtain that 
(B.12)      
1/(2 )
( , ) (0) ( , ) (0)
( , ) ( , ) ,
S S D D
ij i i i j j jS D
i i j j
a j N a i M
N j M i
b b
θθπ ω ϕ ω ϕ
ϕ ω ϕ ω
−
 
= = ⋅  
 
 
By summing over contracts and demander groups it follows from (B.12) that 
(B.13) 
1/(2 )
( , ) (0) ( , ) (0)11 (0)
S S D D
ij i i iS k k k
i
k Wi
a k N a i M
N b b
θθ
ω
π ω ϕ ω ϕ
ϕ
−
∈
 
− = ⋅  
 
∑∑  
and  
(B.14) 
1/(2 )
( , ) (0) ( , ) (0)11 (0)
S S D D
ij k k k j j jD
j
k Wj
a j N a k M
M b b
θθ
ω
θ ω ϕ ω ϕ
ϕ
−
∈
 
− = ⋅  
 
∑∑  
If (B.13) and (B.14) are to be independent of the population size b must depend on N. A suitable 
choice is to let 
  
2/(2 )1 1N
N b
θ−
  = 
 
 
which yields /2.b Nθ=  Hence, in this case we obtain that 
(B.15) 2 1/(2 )( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ) (0) (0) / ) / .S S Di ij iS jD i j i j ij a j w a i w N M N N N
θ θϕ ω π ϕ ϕ −=  
Furthermore, when inserting (B.11) into (B.8) and (B.9) we obtain that 
(B.16)          
1/ (2 ) ( 1)/ (2 )
( , ) (0) ( , ) (0)
( , )
S S D D
ij i i i j j jD
j
a j N a i M
m i N
b b
θ θ θ θ θθπ ω ϕ ω ϕ
ω
− − −
   
=       
   
 
and 
(B.17)      
1/ (2 ) ( 1)/ (2 )( , ) (0) ( , ) (0)( , ) .
D D S S
ij j j jS i i i
i
a i M a j Nm j N
b b
θ θ θ θ θθπ ω ϕ ω ϕ
ω
− − −   
=        
 
From (B.16) and (B.17) it follows readily that 
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( )
( ) ( )
(1 )/(2 )
1/(2 )
(1 )/(2 ) 1/(2 )
/
(0)
(0) / ( ) (0) /
iS
i S D
i i ik k k
k
N N
N N M N
θ θ
θ
θ θ θϕ
ϕ ζ θ ϕ
− −
−
− − −=
+∑
 
and 
 ( )
( ) ( )
(1 )/(2 )
1/(2 )
(1 )/(2 ) 1/(2 )
/
(0)
(0) / ( ) (0) /
jD
j D S
j j kj k k
k
M N
M N N N
θ θ
θ
θ θ θϕ
ϕ ζ θ ϕ
− −
−
− − −=
+∑
 
where 
     1/(2 )( ) ( ( , ) ( , )) .S Dij ij i j
w W
a j w a i wθ θζ θ π −
∈
= ∑  
            Note finally that since the nested logit modelling framework use here can be interpreted as a 
random effect model, the result of Lemma 6 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution of 
the equation system above. This completes the proof. 
                 Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C 
Here, we derive the equilibrium relations of the model of Choo and Siow (2006). In this model utilities 
are transferable and potential partners within each observational category are perfect substitutes. The 
utility functions are specified as follows: 
(C.1)    ( , ) exp( ) ( )S Ssi ij ij ij siU d jω α ω ε= − ,     (0) (0),
S S
si siU ε=    
(C.2)   ( , ) exp( ) ( )D Dd ij ji ij djU s iω β ω ε=   and (0) (0)S Djd jdU ε=   
where the random terms (0),Ssiε (0),
D
jdε ( ),
S
s jε ( ),
D
d iε ,
S
is∈Ω  ,
D
jd ∈Ω i = 1, 2, …, j = 1, 2, …, are 
independent and distributed according to exp( 1/ ),u−  for positive u.  
From (C.1) and (C.2), and standard results in the theory of discrete choice it follows that the 
respective probabilities of realizing a match and of being single are given by 
(C.3)  
exp( )
( , )
1 exp( )
ij ikS
i ij
ik ik
k
j
α ω
ϕ ω
α ω
−
=
+ −∑
,    
exp( )
( , ) ,
1 exp( )
ji ijD
j ij
jk kj
k
i
β ω
ϕ ω
β ω
=
+∑
 
(C.4)  1(0)
1 exp( )
S
i
ik ik
k
ϕ
α ω
=
+ −∑
     and     1(0) ,
1 exp( )
D
j
jk kj
k
ϕ
β ω
=
+∑
 
and where the equilibrium relations are determined by the conditions  
(C.5)                  ( , ) ( , ),S Di i ij j j ijN j M iϕ ω ϕ ω=  for all ( , ).i j   
From (C.3) to (C.5) it follows that  
(C.6)  ( , ) (0)ijS Ssi ij ij ij e
ωϕ ω α ϕ−=   and   ( , ) (0).ijD Dj ij ji ji e
ωϕ ω β ϕ=  
From (C.5) and (C.6) we realize that the equilibrium condition in (C.5) can be expressed as 
(C.7)  (0) (0)ij ijS Di ij i j ji jN e M e
ω ωα ϕ β ϕ− =  
for all (i, j), which implies that 
(C.8)  
1/2
(0)
(0)
ij
S
i ij i
D
j ji j
N
e
M
ω α ϕ
β ϕ
 
=   
 
. 
Furthermore, when the formula for ijω  given in (C.8) is inserted into the first equation in (C.4) we 
obtain that 
(C.9)      
1/2
1(0)
(0)1
(0)
S
i D
k ki k
ik S
k i ik i
M
N
ϕ
β ϕα
α ϕ
=
 
+  
 
∑
(0)
(0) (0) /
S
i
S D
i ik ki k k i
k
M N
ϕ
ϕ α β ϕ
=
+∑
. 
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A similar expression holds for (0).Djϕ  Hence, it follows that the equilibrium choice probabilities are 
determined by 
(C.10a)       1 (0) (0) /
(0)
S D D S
i ik ki k k iS
ki
ϕ α β ϕ λ κ λ
ϕ
− =∑ ,    
(C.10b)             1 (0) (0) /
(0)
D S S D
j ik ki k k jD
kj
ϕ α β ϕ λ λ κ
ϕ
− =∑  
and 
(C.11)       ( ) (0) (0) / .S S D D Si ik ki i j k ijϕ α β ϕ ϕ λ κ λ=  
Provided a unique solution of (C.10a,b) exists it follows that the contract ijω  is determined by (C.8) 
and the choice probability in (C.11) is uniquely determined.  
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